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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 4 
Introduction 
Human life and reality are embedded in language, in the sense that sharing a social 
and physical space implies a need for communication. Although there exist clear 
grammatical, syntactic and semantic rules, the workings of communicative processes 
and language as such, and the very origins of meaning seem to be grounded in 
implicit knowledge, conventions and “know-hows” within individuals and social 
groups.  
 
In an academic context, linguistics has dealt with the structures and uses of language. 
Philosophy has taken an interest in language for various reasons. One of those 
reasons is the function that language has in expressing truths, theories, meanings and 
problems achieved and/or inquired by the discipline. Another reason is the 
epistemological role that language plays as an inquiring tool to distinguish between 
truths and mere beliefs, and yet a third reason is a mere metaphysical investigation of 
the source of meaning and the nature of language as such. 
 
The intention of this project is to investigate these various roles that philosophy 
assigns to language, the roles it has for individuals and groups, and how meaning 
comes about. This will indirectly lead us to the problem concerning the role of 
philosophy as an academic discipline. This investigation will be based on the 
Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) philosophy of language, 
especially as it is presented in his two distinctive philosophical periods as they are 
represented in his works Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and in 
Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953)
1
. 
                                         
1
 Further on we will refer to these works as Tractatus (when quoting: TLP) and Philosophical 
Investigations  (when quoting: PI), respectively.  
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Furthermore we have chosen to focus on Wittgenstein’s philosophy because of the 
fact that throughout his life he devoted himself mainly to the study and inquiry of the 
philosophy of language, and because of the impact his works have had in relation to 
the way modern philosophy – and other academic disciplines such as sociology, 
ethnography, religious and cultural studies, pedagogy, etc. – conceive language and 
meaning. 
 
In the first part of his philosophical career, Wittgenstein devoted himself to the 
development of a theory wherein language, due to its logical structure also shared by 
the world, serves a medium to represent reality, in other words, language is the best 
mean to know the world.  
In the last years of Wittgenstein’s life, he changed the course of his earlier thoughts 
towards a philosophy that focused on the meaning of language, this time the meaning  
of language came about in relation to its use. Language here obtains a certain 
meaning in relation to the situation in which it is used, and in relation to the rules 
governing a specific communication. Rules, according to Wittgenstein, cannot be 
followed in isolation but only in relation to other people. 
 
This relation between subjects brings one to the social context in which language is 
used. Even though Wittgenstein’s philosophical presentations take into account the 
existence of more than one subject in the context of language use and 
communication, they do so on a philosophical plan and thus do not account for 
explicit social consequences that can be brought by language use and meaning. They 
neither have the explicit aspect of aim and intention as it is, for example, presented in 
the speech act theories by John L. Austin (1911-1960) and John Searle (1932-). 
Therefore, in order to look more into the communicative usage of language between 
different individuals, some of the studies done by Jürgen Habermas (1929) about the 
pragmatics and intersubjectivity of communication, which to some extent are based 
on speech act theory, will be used in the project. Habermas will also be employed to 
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study the relation between the different uses and functions of language in practice, 
and in this manner bring the aspect of socialization into the project. 
One of the main reasons to choose Habermas is that he himself based his theories and 
studies on the work of Wittgenstein and showed how a philosophy of language can 
be used to support social studies and theories. 
Field of Interest 
The focus throughout the project will be to look at the function of language based on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly focusing on the relation between thought, 
language and the world. This, as mentioned above, will be accompanied by looking 
into some aspects of the pragmatics of language as described in Habermas’ theories 
on communication. 
Problem Definition 
Cardinal Question: 
With the emphasis on language, how do thought, language and the world relate to 
each other? 
Sub-questions: 
1. How does meaning arise? Does it arise at all? 
2. How do the views on language and the notions about the origin of meaning, as 
presented throughout Wittgenstein’s works, influence the status and role of 
philosophy? 
3. How are communication, common understanding and socialization embedded 
in language? 
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Methodology 
The project will be approached, by attempting to shed light on the problem definition 
through the study of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Philosophical 
Investigations. 
 
The idea behind studying Tractatus is to look into the status of language within an 
epistemological investigation, one that particularly focuses on logic as the ground for 
understanding reality and the world. What Tractatus brings to this project, when 
related to our cardinal question, is an option to study how Wittgenstein in this book 
perceives the relation between language, thought and world, as this is a central point 
in the book. In the case of Tractatus, Wittgenstein is concerned with the shared, 
logical structures that pervade these aspects.  In this context it should be mentioned 
that many other aspects of Tractatus – such as Wittgenstein’s account for truths-
functions and his interpretation and critique of some of Bertrand Russell’s (1872-
1970) theories – could be studied in depth, but since they do not have the same 
relevance for our field of interest we have chosen not to do so.   
 
Since the status of language that is dominant in Tractatus is that of language as a 
descriptive tool, we found it necessary to expand our focus to other functions of 
language. We chose to do this through Philosophical Investigations. This work 
represents, through its notion of meaning as use, a remarkably different starting point, 
in its attempt to illuminate the relation between thought, language and the world.  
The dynamic role that language has in this setting gives us the possibility of looking 
into new functions of language and to focus on the communicative aspect of it, which 
is to a great extent related to our cardinal question. However, there are certain 
concepts in Philosophical Investigations we have chosen not to deal with, as for 
example the notion of logical grammar, as these were less relevant for our project. 
Another motivation for choosing Philosophical Investigations is that it, to some 
extent, presents a critique of Tractatus that puts the latter in a new perspective, this 
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fact is also our motive for comparing certain aspects of the two in the concluding part 
of this project.  At this state we would like to mention, that unfortunately the limited 
time frame prevented us from bringing Wittgenstein’s work On Certainty (published 
posthumously in 1969) into the project, which would have enabled us to go deeper 
into the epistemological aspects of this study. Even though the study of meaning is 
not epistemology itself, it naturally overlaps many of the aspects dealt with in 
epistemology. In On Certainty Wittgenstein takes a starting point in Moore’s truisms 
and thus he moves in a more epistemological direction. If given more time we would 
have liked to make a connection between that aspect and our discussion about the 
source of meaning. 
 
Some features of Habermas’ theories as presented in On the Pragmatics of Social 
Interaction
2
, On the Pragmatics of Communication
3
 and The Theory of 
Communicative Action (1981), will be used to look closer into the aspects of 
intersubjectivity and interaction in communication. Furthermore Habermas will 
present us with a complementary perspective on Wittgenstein’s studies and a more 
recent view on language and communication. 
 
The investigating method, with which we have been working, has been to describe 
and interpret the relevant sections of the philosophical sources used, followed by our 
critique of it. Throughout the chapters of this report we have chosen to combine these 
different methodological elements, in order to maintain a more fluent and natural 
sequence throughout the different topics presented in them and to avoid skipping 
from one context to another. We have found that this process helped us to maintain a 
more coherent and focused line of argumentation. 
 
                                         
2
 A compilation of the Christian Gauss lectures from 1971, published in 2001. 
3
 A compilation of lectures from the late 1980’s 
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It is clear that language is the compulsory method to use in order to transmit our 
research, we therefore find it necessary to discuss what role language plays in this 
context and how it affects the way we communicate. First of all we find it pertinent to 
debate whether language functions as a tool divided from the subjective realm or if it, 
in contrast, is embedded in this realm. Throughout this project we analyze language, 
but we do so through language itself. In this sense language cannot be perceived as a 
tool, as it is not possible, for example within an academic context, to “put it down”. 
On the other hand language does, to some extend, seem to have some “tool-like” 
qualities, since it can be used to achieve specific goals. This should not only be 
understood in the obvious way that any language use has a function – this is of course 
true, because otherwise language would be pointless and without any raison d´être – 
it should also be understood in the sense that one can, through ones choice of words 
express ones opinions and critique implicitly in a given text. The outcome must be 
that language contains both; a certain tool-like quality and a quality so embedded in 
us that we are not able to step outside it: It is transcendental. In that context there is 
something paradoxical about studying language; as it is never possible to escape it, 
we will never really be able to see the whole of it, but on the other hand, if we were 
able to see the whole of it we would never be able to say anything about it, as we 
would then find ourselves outside it. 
Dimensions 
The intention will be to cover the dimension of Philosophy and Science by applying 
Wittgenstein’s studies to our research, and by approaching our problem definition 
from a clearly philosophical perspective, looking into key concepts in philosophy. 
Furthermore we intend to cover the dimension of Subjectivity and Learning, by 
approaching Philosophical Investigations from a sociological perspective (among 
others), focusing on the aspect of socialization through and in language. Our 
investigation of Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which constructs a 
 10 
social theory on the basis of formal pragmatics, will also play an important role in 
this context. 
 11 
 
Chapter II 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
 12 
Introduction 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s only work published in his 
lifetime. It was first printed in 1921 in the German paper Annalen der 
Naturphilosophie. A year later an English translation introduced by Bertrand Russell 
was published. Tractatus is mainly the result of Wittgenstein’s reflections and notes 
taken as a soldier during the First World War, particularly in the years 1914-1917. 
The book had a strong impact in philosophical and scientific circles in Europe.  
 
There are different sources of inspiration in the Tractatus. There is the influence of 
Arthur Schopenhauer’s
4
 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1818), which 
Wittgenstein read in his youth and that contains notions of philosophical idealism. 
This influence can be seen in the returning topics of transcendental nature found in 
Tractatus. But the work mainly comes about as a continuation and reaction to 
Bertrand Russell’s Principia Mathematica (1910), and Gottlob Frege’s (1848-1925) 
conceptions about logic and language. 
 
Frege and Russell’s works altered the way philosophy deals with logic and language. 
Frege changed the way traditional Aristotelian logic analyzed propositions into 
subject and predicate, by instead analysing them into argument and function. 
Arguments were substituted by variables, so that the truth-value of a function 
depends on the specific argument, that is used in the place of the variable.
5
 Frege also 
introduced the distinction between meaning, reference and sense. For example, a 
sentence, word or name expresses a sense; the thought behind the expression, and at 
the same time connotes a meaning or truth-condition, or in other words, the factors 
                                         
4
 Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), 
5
 Glock 1996: 14 
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making that expression true or false. The reference of a term or sentence is the object 
or fact they refer to.
6
  
Russell’s and Whitehead’s work, Principia Mathematica, differed in some topics 
with Frege’s theory but, as the latter did, Russell thought of his system as one that 
avoids the drawbacks produced by the logical problems found in natural languages. 
One of the unique legacies of Russell was the implementation of these logical 
theories into the disciplines of epistemology and metaphysics, bringing philosophy 
into the status of a science.
7
 
 
Wittgenstein’s correspondence during the war with his friends, the Cambridge 
philosopher George Edward Moore (1873-1958)
8
 and the economist John Maynard 
Keynes (1883-1946) also proved influential for his work. Moore claimed in his 
works, among other things, that philosophers must have been radically confused as to 
the nature and purpose of their activities.
9
 Keynes wrote A Treatise on Probability 
(1921), an important work about the logical theory of probability, where he stated 
that probability consists of an evidential relation between propositions
10
, a topic that 
Wittgenstein also treats in Tractatus. 
 
One of Wittgenstein’s principal goals in Tractatus is to determine what philosophy 
should deal with, in other words which realm belongs to the philosophical doctrine. 
As Wittgenstein clearly says in the preface of Tractatus, the aim of his work is to 
draw the limits of thought, in order to define, once and for all, what the function of 
philosophy is. The author will investigate the limits of thought by drawing the limits 
of language, the expression of thought, because in order to draw a limit to thought 
one should be able to think, or mentally picture, both sides of that limit, i.e. one 
would have to think the unthinkable. For Wittgenstein the “outer” side of the limit 
                                         
6
 Appiah 2003: 88-90 
7
 Glock 1996: 15 
8
 British philosopher, who made important contributions to epistemology and moral philosophy. 
9
 Honderich, Ted, ed. 2005: 619. 
10
 Honderich, Ted, ed. 2005: 473. 
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and what lies beyond is nonsense. According to him one cannot think the 
unthinkable, but one can express a nonsensical proposition. By these “limits” we 
understand the following: The limits of language refer to that which can be said 
within a logical structure, i.e. that which can be said and can be analyzed through 
logic. By the limits of thought, we are to understand that which can be thought and 
that can be logically represented. And by the limits of the world, we are to understand 
the phenomena that can be represented in a logical manner, and therefore becomes 
the matter for philosophical concern. The three concepts are related in such a way 
that language is an expression of thought, and thought and language together are 
capable of expressing every “possible world”, thus intertwined with fixing the limits 
of the world. 
In this manner language becomes a necessary tool to investigate the limits of thought: 
 
4.003  Most of the propositions and questions to be found in 
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently 
we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can 
only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions 
and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to 
understand the logic of our language.  
  (They belong to the same class as the question whether the 
good is more or less identical than the beautiful.) 
And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not 
problems at all. 
 
Our intentions for using Tractatus will be to investigate the status of language within 
an epistemological inquiry, especially one that takes logic as the ground for 
understanding reality and the world. In a broader sense we will use Tractatus to look 
at the function of philosophy as such, i.e. what the aim and intention of a 
philosophical study is. The function of language that is presented in Tractatus has 
great consequences. If what Wittgenstein claims is that it is possible through logic 
and language to make a clear connection between mind and the world, then he is 
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offering a solution to essential epistemological questions. Our focus and interest in 
connection to Tractatus is to see whether Wittgenstein really is claiming to have 
found such a solution and, if that is the case, we would like to investigate if he has 
succeeded in doing so. 
 
This chapter will contain a commentary on the literary composition of Tractatus 
followed by and interpretation of the main claims presented in the book, with a clear 
focus on those, we find to be most relevant for our field of interest. The interpretation 
will be combined with our reflection and critique of these claims. 
Overlook 
In Tractatus Wittgenstein makes use of a very stringent language, with few 
adjectives, illustrations and examples. The work contains many terms that seem, at 
first glance, to come from an established philosophical terminology. This is however 
rarely the case, numerous of them are terms that Wittgenstein uses, without giving 
definitions or illustrations of their specific meaning. This, of course, opens up for 
different interpretations of many of the terms, and thereby for different 
interpretations of the text.  
Tractatus is constructed using the structure of seven main propositions. The 
propositions that follow proposition 1, are commentaries and elaborations of the 
former, for exp. proposition 1.1 and 1.2 are an elaboration of proposition 1, 
proposition 1.11 and 1.13 are an elaboration of proposition 1.1 and so on. However, it 
seems that Wittgenstein deviates from this structure e.g. there is a proposition 
numbered 2.01, which should then be an elaboration to proposition 2.0 – which does 
not exist. The structure is, on Wittgenstein’s part, meant as a guidance, leading one to 
understand which propositions should be interpreted as the most important points of 
the book: “The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the 
logical importance of the propositions, the stress laid on them in my exposition” 
(TLP note to proposition 1). This structure does, however, not seem to be followed 
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strictly, as new points are at times presented in the subordinate propositions. On the 
other hand it is clear that the numbering of the propositions do generally function as 
systemizing the book. Even though, many detours are taken, the sub-numbered 
propositions do lead in a circular movement back to their main proposition, as for 
example seen in connection to proposition 3: “A logical picture of facts is a thought.” 
The last sub-proposition before proposition 4 is: “A propositional sign, applied and 
thought out, is a thought”, thus leading the reader back to proposition 3. Furthermore, 
it seems that there is yet a connection between the propositions, as proposition 4 
sounds: “A thought is a proposition with a sense” and thus a connection is made 
between the theme treated in 3 and what follows in 4; it leads to the next theme and 
the next circle of elaborations. Of course the way in which one interprets the structure 
of Tractatus, influences which themes one sees as being the most important ones. 
Thus, if one does not see the propositions commenting on the sub-propositions (e.g. 
6.4312) as parts of a circular movement, all of importance in connection to reaching 
understanding of the main proposition, but in stead see them as less important points, 
not equally connected to the main proposition under which they are presented, one 
could for example arrive at the conclusion that the transcendental does not play an 
important role to Wittgenstein, as nearly every point made about this topic is placed 
in the propositions commenting on the sub-propositions (a part from proposition 7 
that tells us that we should refrain from dealing with the transcendental within 
philosophy). This can, of course also be used the other way around; Seeing Tractatus 
from a religious perspective may bring one to conclude that the reason the 
transcendental, which includes God, is mentioned in the end of the book, is that this 
is the concluding part, which the rest of the book merely leads towards. Reading it 
from a positivistic viewpoint may lead one to the opposite; the transcendental is 
mentioned in the end because it is not Wittgenstein’s main field of interest, but 
merely something that serves as examples on how his notion of logical structures in 
language should influence our thinking. The structure of Tractatus actually brings to 
mind the logical structure that, according to Wittgenstein, is shared by language, 
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thoughts and the world; this will be dealt with in more detail later in this 
commentary. 
 
The seven main propositions are: 
1. The world is all that is the case. 
2. What is the case–a fact–is the existence of states of affairs. 
3. A logical picture of facts is a thought. 
4. A thought is a proposition with a sense. 
5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.  
 (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.) 
6. The general form of a truth-function is [ ,!, N(!)]. 
This is the general form of a proposition.  
7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.  
 
The first two propositions deal with a presentation of Wittgenstein’s view on the way 
the world is constituted. Proposition 3 and 4 deal mostly with the relation between 
thought, language and the world, particularly the common logical structure they all 
share and the way representation is possible due to this common characteristic. 
Proposition 5 and 6 mainly have to do with the very logical structure and 
construction of propositions. Wittgenstein concludes Tractatus with the single 
seventh proposition where he states that one should refrain from trying to deal with 
the transcendental, at least within language and philosophy. 
 
One could say that Wittgenstein starts his work from a meta-perspective and 
throughout the following propositions he zooms-in, into the very heart of logic in 
language to then, towards the end of the sixth series of propositions, try to present in 
a more explicit way the tension produced by this logical structure of reality and the 
existence of the transcendental. 
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The World of Tractatus 
This subchapter will concern itself with the claims found in Tractatus that deal with 
defining reality. The intention is to clarify the essential notions about what the world 
is and how it is defined by Wittgenstein. This will be followed by a study of the role 
of language, thought and logic and how the way in which these are connected leads 
to a certain epistemological point of view.  
 
1.  The world is all that is the case. 
 
2.  What is the case–a fact–is the existence of states of affairs. 
 
2.04  The totality of existing states of affairs is the world. 
 
2.05  The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which 
states of affairs do not exist. 
 
2.06  The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.11 
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and 
their non-existence a negative fact.) 
 
2.063  The sum-total of reality is the world. 
 
For Wittgenstein the world is facts in logical space (TLP 1.13). A fact is the existence 
of a state of affairs, which in turn is a combination of objects in logical space. 
Therefore “Objects contain the possibility of all situations” (TLP 2.014), in the same 
manner as the numbers from 0 to 9 can construct any other possible number. In this 
                                         
11
  Even though in this proposition Wittgenstein seems to define reality in a clear way, there appear 
to be some contradictions later on, e.g. in TLP 4.06, “A proposition can be true or false only in 
virtue of being a picture of reality.” Here Wittgenstein seems to use the word reality to refer to the 
totality of existing/true phenomena. 
 
 19 
example only ten digits, or objects, can construct infinite combinations.  Like this a 
finite number of objects can construct an infinite number of states of affairs.  
But opposed to numbers, objects, according to Wittgenstein, are simple (TLP 2.02), 
this meaning that they are not a composite, they make up the substance of the world 
(TLP 2.021). 
 
But the world is not only the sum of true facts, but also the sum of false facts. False 
facts are in this case states of affairs in logical space, which are not the case; in other 
words, which cannot be found apart from being mere propositions or thoughts. For 
example if one were to say “The green man is carrying his car on his shoulders,” this 
will be a logical proposition; i.e. it can be understood by those who understand the 
English language, it can be imagined, but is not true. So this state of affair, portrayed 
by the proposition, is a part of the world by it being a negative fact. 
Language, Thought, Logic and the World 
The claims described above raises the question of how the limits of the world can be 
drawn, when the possibility of states of affairs are infinite. In order to avoid this 
problem Wittgenstein’s mode of delimitation will be from the outside to the inside, 
that is to say finding the limits by looking at that, which cannot be said clearly and in 
a logical way. 
 
In this case language plays a dominant role. As mentioned above, it is only through 
language that the limit can be defined because of the impossibility, according to 
Wittgenstein, of thinking illogically (TLP 3.03). But thought is, according to 
Tractatus, also highly connected to language: 
 
4  A thought is a proposition with a sense. 
 
4.001   The totality of propositions is language. 
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4.01    A proposition is a picture of reality.  
   A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. 
 
Wittgenstein starts the fourth proposition of Tractatus, by stating that a thought is a 
meaningful sentence. Following these lines one could conclude that thought is a 
picture or model of the world. But even though Wittgenstein introduces section four 
of Tractatus by giving a short definition of a thought, he does not go into more detail 
regarding the nature of thoughts. According to Wittgenstein, these are disguised by 
language (TLP 4.002), somehow in the same way a rapper’s body is disguised by his 
“hip hop” clothes, and this happens because language is not designed to expose 
thought, but to expose reality (TLP 4.01). 
 
A proposition is a model of reality, a model that produces a mental picture of it (TLP 
4.01). Due to the logical structure shared by reality, language and thought, a 
proposition is able to depict, or model, a situation (a state of affairs) in its totality, so 
that if the proposition were to be true, one would know the situation in question by 
understanding the proposition (TLP 4.024). 
 
In this case the situation, the proposition and the thought are connected by their 
“logical picture” (TLP 4.03). The sense of a proposition comes about by the 
proposition representing a situation, not by the proposition explicitly stating its 
intended sense (TLP 4.031). But the sense of the proposition is independent from the 
truth-value of the proposition, i.e. whether it is true or not. Therefore the sense 
depends on, or is given by, the logical structure, not by the truth-value of the referent 
(TLP 4.063-4). 
 
In proposition 4.12 Wittgenstein claims that propositions can represent the whole of 
reality, but they cannot explicitly represent their own structure, logical form, since 
that is what they have in common with the world. Logical form expresses itself in 
language, but language cannot represent it (TLP 4.121). One could probably use the 
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image of a mirror that can reflect an object placed in front of it, but is unable to 
reflect itself. So the existence of the logical structure (internal property in 
Wittgenstein’s terms) of a situation expresses itself in the proposition that represents 
the situation, by means of the proposition’s equal logical structure or internal 
property. 
 
Wittgenstein then concludes the series of propositions 4.12 - 4.128 by stating that 
logical forms are without number and therefore there are no pre-eminent numbers in 
logic, this leads to the conclusion that there is no philosophical monism or dualism. 
Within logic one is outside of the dualistic discussion.  
 
The fact that logical forms transcend the discussion of monism and dualism could be 
understood as, in the case of monism, a critique to Russell’s theory, which states that 
the world is constituted by one sort of entity, or stuff, and that the fundamental nature 
of this stuff is neither mental nor physical. This theory carries the problem that the 
characterization of this stuff cannot, apparently, be clearly given.
12
 The fact that 
dualism is also transcended could be understood as going beyond the problematic of 
the existence of two distinct phenomena, mind and matter, as it happens in a 
Cartesian context for example. This could be understood in the sense that within 
logic, one transcends the problematic aspect that the study of mind can bring within a 
scientific analysis, i.e. that mind-events cannot be scientifically studied, at least the 
view could have been so at the time Tractatus was written. 
Elementary Propositions 
In proposition 4.21 Wittgenstein begins to present the concept of “elementary 
propositions”; they consist of names, are actually a series or nexus of names. The 
sign of a proposition being an elementary one, is that there is no other elementary 
                                         
12
 Honderich, Ted, ed. 2005: 652. 
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proposition contradicting it (TLP 4.211). Here is an abstract from A. Kenny’s book 
Wittgenstein (1973: 68) regarding elementary propositions:  
 
To states of affairs, which are concatenations of simple objects, there 
correspond elementary propositions, which assert the existence of states 
of affairs; elementary propositions are concatenations of names for simple 
objects (TLP 4.21-4.221). The world can be completely described by 
listing all elementary propositions, and then listing which of them are true 
and which false (TLP 4.26). For the true elementary propositions will 
record all the positive facts, and the false elementary propositions will 
correspond to all the negative facts, and the totality of the facts is the 
world (TLP 2.06, 1.1). 
 
In proposition 6 Wittgenstein gives an account of how to deduce the truth functions 
of an elementary proposition: 
 
6. The general form of a truth-function is [p, !, N (!)]. 
    This is the general form of a proposition. 
 
This sentence should be interpreted in the following way: p represents the entire class 
of elementary propositions, ! is a subgroup within that group. N stands for negation. 
Thus, proposition 6 is a prescription to deduce the truth-functions for an elementary 
proposition. This can be clarified through the following example: There exists a class 
of all elementary propositions containing p,q,r,s,t,v,…etc. From that class we select p 
and q. p and q are now the subgroup called !: ! = (p,q). We then make a negation of 
!, namely of p and q. Negating them is equivalent to saying: “neither p nor q are true. 
This can also be written as (p|q). (p|q) is then the first truth-function that is possible 
for !. The second possible truth function for ! can be found for negating the first 
truth-function: N (N (p,q)) this leads to: not (p|q), meaning: not (neither p nor q are 
true), or expressed a little clearer: ~ (p|q). The result of this negation is then “either p 
or q or both are true. This can be expressed like this: pvq. This is the second truth 
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function of the class !. To find the third you would then have to do a negation of pvq, 
a negation of that negation would lead you to the fourth and so on. Shortly put, 
proposition 6 is an instruction in how to deduce the truth-functions of an elementary 
proposition 
 
Wittgenstein proposes to fix the limits of the world, by looking into how many 
propositions one can construct by using elementary propositions (TLP 4.51). In this 
sense language becomes a tool to deal with reality, to represent it. The purpose, or 
truth-function, of a proposition is to describe the world (TLP 5). Through the use of 
logic and language one is also able to use inference as a way to deduce the truth-
value of states of affairs, which cannot be directly perceived or known. It is clear that 
anything cannot be inferred from anything, for example an elementary proposition 
cannot be inferred from another elementary proposition (TLP 5.134). Since thought 
and language are contained in a logical structure, they constitute, together with all 
“external” objects, the world, reality. 
Picture Theory, Meaning and Some Critical Remarks 
Wittgenstein presented the logical structure shared between thought, language and 
reality through his Picture Theory. 
 
2.1  We picture facts to ourselves. 
 
2.11  A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and   
non-existence of states of affairs. 
 
A picture presents a situation, i.e. is a model of reality (TLP 2.12). 
The elements of a picture represent the objects that, that picture represents (TLP 
2.13). The elements of a picture are related to one another in the same manner as the 
elements are related in the states of affairs depicted by the picture (TLP 2.15). 
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2.151  Pictorial form is a possibility that things are related to one and  
 another in the same way as the elements of a picture. 
 
2.1511  That is how a picture is attached to reality, it reaches right out to 
it. 
 
The connection of the elements of a picture is according to Wittgenstein, called “the 
structure of the picture” and the possibility of this structure “the pictorial form” of the 
picture. The pictorial form of the picture is what a picture has in common with 
reality, in order to be able to depict it (TLP 2.17) 
 
A picture can depict anything whose forms are identical with that of the picture, but a 
picture cannot depict its own pictorial form, it can only display it, or make it apparent 
(TLP 2.171 & 2.172). 
 
The pictorial relationship is the correlation of the picture elements with the things 
represented by the picture (TLP 2.1515). Hence there must be something in common 
between the picture and what it depicts, for the picture to be a representation of a 
particular state of affairs (TLP 2.161). This common feature, between the picture and 
the state of affairs, is what Wittgenstein calls “logical form” (TLP 2.18) “a picture 
whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture” (TLP 2.181). 
 
3  A logical picture of facts is a thought. 
 
So one can deduce that a thought, according to Wittgenstein, always has common 
features and a shared logical structure with some fact of reality, and therefore “what 
is thinkable is possible too” (TLP 3.02). 
 
3.03  Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we 
should have to think illogically. 
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In this way Wittgenstein shows how it is impossible to think the unthinkable, and so 
supports the use of language in the epistemological investigation of trying to find the 
limits of the world, as presented in the preface. But Wittgenstein seems to contradict 
what he states in proposition 3.032:  
 
3.032  It is impossible to represent in language anything that 
“contradicts logic” as it is in geometry to represent by its co-
ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give 
the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist. 
 
If it were impossible to represent in language anything that contradicts logic then 
mentioning and talking about God would not have any quality of representation. How 
can one express oneself about ethics and metaphysics without representing them in 
one way or the other? How can people come to certain ethical conventions and 
agreements if ethics cannot be represented?  
Can something be understood and discussed without being represented? How can 
there be illogical propositions without the existence of illogical thought? If one has a 
thought about, for example, ethics and according to Wittgenstein we are not capable 
of thinking illogically (TLP 3.03) so this thought about ethics must be a logical 
thought and as all thoughts should be possible to express in propositions, we can 
express this thought as a proposition. But then the proposition, since it deals with 
something that belongs to the transcendental, is illogical. Could one not think about 
God then? Wittgenstein certainly did.  
This brings one to the standpoint that it is indeed possible to think illogically, in 
contrast to Wittgenstein’s claim throughout the Tractatus that this is not so. This 
brings into question Wittgenstein’s picture theory, especially the notion of a shared 
logical structure between thought and reality.  
 
This theory does, however, raise several other questions, one of them being whether a 
reduction of the structure or form of thoughts is necessary for the theory to be true: 
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according to Wittgenstein a thought is a logical picture that can be expressed in a 
proposition. But since a thought (even though it may share the “structure” of objects 
with the proposition) does not seem to be identical with the proposition that expresses 
it, is it then not a necessity to restructure the thought in order to match it with a 
proposition? And if such a restructuring is necessary is it then really possible to say 
that the thought is a logical picture of the proposition?  
 
Another critique that could be addressed is, that in order for the picture theory to 
function there has to be something in language that is absolute, like it was once  
believed that there has to be something in the physical world that is absolute, for 
everything else to be defined. Wittgenstein claims that this is also the case in 
language; some objects do not need to be defined by other objects, instead their 
meaning is contained solely in their name (TLP 3.26). But does that really have to be 
the structure of language? Wittgenstein sees it as a linear regress argument in style 
of: Here is a book, a book is made of paper, paper is made of wood, wood is brown 
and made of different elements, etc. What is meant by this is that every concept in 
language needs other concepts to define its meaning, these concepts must then have 
their meaning defined by new concepts, this leading to an endless line of definitions 
and concepts. Wittgenstein claims that at some point there must be an end to this line, 
for all the other definitions to be possible; as mentioned before an object defined 
solely by its name and thus not dependant on any other objects to express its 
definition and gain its meaning. These names are what Wittgenstein calls primitive 
signs. These are what elementary propositions are constituted of, and thus, 
elementary propositions play a role in giving meaning to any other proposition. The 
question is whether it is not just as valid to think of this chain of objects and 
definitions (book, paper, wood, etc.) as a circular movement, where  – opposed to the 
linear view – the chain of definitions does not end with an object that is absolute – 
that does not need other concepts for its definition – but instead it does not end at all: 
every concept, without exception, is defined by other concepts, thus no longer 
creating a linear movement, but instead a circular. In that case, one would never end 
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up with an object defined only by its name but always with a definition pointing 
towards another object or name, and thus there would be nothing absolute in 
language. That this should not be possible in the physical world does not seem as a 
good argument for why it should not be possible in language, especially since neither 
Wittgenstein nor any of his successors have been able to give a concrete example on 
a simple object or a primitive sign.  
 
It can be argued that the picture theory has some very far-reaching epistemological 
consequences; according to Wittgenstein your thoughts share a structure with reality. 
If this is to be believed, the question is whether one of the consequences is, that 
Wittgenstein has proved a connection between the mind and reality, or thought and 
world, because the mind is not able to step outside this structure. If it is not possible 
to escape this structure shared with the world, the consequence must be that the world 
is a part of it. 
The Role of Philosophy 
 
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.  
 Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.  
 A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.  
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but 
rather in the clarification of propositions.  
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and 
indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp 
boundaries. 
 
Through the use of language and logic, Wittgenstein’s intention is to delimitate the 
field of that which philosophy should deal with and describe. By restricting the 
“philosophical field” in this way, whatever cannot be analyzed by logic is placed 
outside “the limits of the world”. 
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Wittgenstein presents his solution to the philosophical problems at the beginning of 
section four (see the quote above). He states that the philosophical questions up until 
now arose as a misunderstanding of the nature of language, namely its logical 
structure; this making those questions and problems (posed by philosophy) not false 
but nonsensical, meaningless. Philosophical problems arise due to lack understanding 
the logic of our language.  
 
According to Tractatus philosophy should deal with the logical modeling of reality, 
the logic of everyday language and the logical structures of thought. By marking this 
limit Wittgenstein eradicates the so-called problems of philosophy. 
 
4.113  Philosophy sets limits to the much-disputed sphere of natural 
science. 
 
4.114 It must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what 
cannot be thought.  
It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards 
through what can be thought. 
 
4.115  It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can 
be said. 
 
4.116  Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. 
Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly.  
 
Wittgenstein places philosophy apart from natural sciences and psychology, for him 
the only way to draw the limit of what is meaningful, the limit of the world, is 
through finding the limits of what can be said and what can be thought in a clear way. 
 
 “All philosophy is a 'critique of language'” (TLP 4.0031), in this way Wittgenstein 
draws the line of what philosophy should be. Philosophy should not deal with the 
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outside concrete world as the natural sciences do, neither with the metaphysical 
realm. Wittgenstein here withdraws language and understanding from socialization 
and contextualization. 
 
One could certainly argue whether Wittgenstein’s claim of having found a solution, 
in the sense of having solved the problems of philosophy, is a valid one or whether 
this solution is but a placing away the so called problems, somehow in the same 
manner as placing the dust under the carpet instead of actually removing it from the 
room, a point that will be discussed further later in this chapter.  
Is Reality Reduced Only to Logic Then?  
Until this point the focus in this chapter has been mainly on the logical aspect of 
Tractatus, which is certainly its predominant aspect. But in spite of this 
predominance there are frequent references to concepts such as God, free will, soul, 
certainty and ethics, all these intertwined with metaphysical questions. The idea in 
this section will be to investigate and discuss the role that the mystical and the 
transcendental play in Wittgenstein’s work. 
 
In Tractatus there is a tension between the transcendental and the expressible. The 
usual meaning of the term “transcendental” is “of or relating to a spiritual or non-
physical realm”
13
, however the term when used by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), has 
a broader meaning: as something that is presupposed in and necessary to experience, 
as for example expressed in the following argument: “There is experience; the truth 
of some proposition p is a conceptually necessary condition of the possibility of 
experience, therefore p.”
14
 Wittgenstein does not give any definition of what he 
means when using the expression, but we interpret his use of it as closely connected 
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to the first definition given above. This should, however, not be understood in the 
sense that Wittgenstein does not believe in the existence of the concepts and 
phenomena that he attributes as belonging to the transcendental. He is merely 
classifying these as that which cannot be represented by logic, thus belonging to 
another realm or world, and consequently lying outside the limits of “the world” he 
intends to represent through logic, and outside that which philosophy should deal 
with. 
 
In the midst of the logical structure of reality, as presented in Tractatus, there seems 
to be place for “a philosophical self” who is the “metaphysical subject, the limit of 
the world” (TLP 5.641), while ultimately “there is no such a thing as the subject that 
thinks or entertains ideas.” (TLP 5.631). Another example is the mentioning of God, 
Who appears as being subjected in His creation to the laws of logic (TLP 3.031 and 
5.123). Wittgenstein also brings about topics such as the freedom of the will, even if 
it is later described as “the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future” 
(TLP 5.1362).  
 
Values, ethics and aesthetics are for Wittgenstein transcendental and so is logic (TLP 
6.13). So logic lies itself outside the world, it cannot be described, but it manifests 
itself in language, thoughts and events.  
 
In relation to this mystical aspect of Tractatus many questions arise, such as for 
example: Is the author’s intention that the mystical aspects and phenomena are of no 
use and therefore should not be dealt with at all, or is he merely trying to separate 
them from the “logical world” in order to make it possible to deal with such 
transcendental aspects – even if they would be dealt in a different manner than when 
dealing with the “logical world”? If the latter is the case, then how does Wittgenstein 
imagine that they should be dealt with, and what would their function be? Does he 
find the transcendental to have any influence on the world and, if yes, how is this 
influence perceived and accounted for/justified? 
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Where the early interpretations of Tractatus, as it was interpreted by the Vienna 
circle
15
, saw the concepts belonging to the mystical as nothing of importance, merely 
as coincidental comments on metaphysics, Wittgenstein himself seems to have had a 
different agenda – as he writes to his friend and publisher L. von Ficker in 1919:  
 
 
The book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface 
a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you 
here, because it will perhaps be a key for the work for you. What I meant 
to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: The one presented 
here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that 
is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical 
from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY 
rigorous way of drawing those limits.16 
 
Thus, the role of the mystical in Tractatus can, and has been, interpreted in (at least) 
two different ways, the first one being the perspective mentioned above that 
Wittgenstein was merely trying to discard concepts such as God, ethics and aesthetics 
because he found that these contained no values. Seen from this angle the logical 
aspects of Tractatus are an attempt to place “the mystical” outside logic - and outside 
what can be talked about –once and for all, so philosophy no longer had to deal with 
these aspects. 
 
But one could argue that the mystical aspect does actually play an important role for 
Wittgenstein (this view would represent the second perspective mentioned before), 
                                         
15
 The Vienna Circle was a group of intellectuals with considerable scientific and mathematical 
training that started meeting in Vienna in 1907. Its discussions, activities and work proved central 
for the development of Logical Positivism and theses like the ‘verification principle’, which regards 
sentences that are neither analytic nor empirically provable as meaningless (neither true nor false). 
In this sense it considers sentences about metaphysical, religious, aesthetic and ethical claims 
meaningless, unless they can purport something that could be verified empirically or analytically. 
(Honderich, Ted, ed. 2005: 541 and 945-946) 
16
 Engelmann, 1967: 143 
 32 
since it is this aspect that in the end shapes the particular qualities and characteristics 
of the logical world. This can be seen clearly in the following propositions: 
 
6.41  The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world 
everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: 
in it no value exists –and if it did exist, it would have no value.  
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the 
whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that 
happens and is the case is accidental.  
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if 
it did it would itself be accidental.  
 It must lie outside the world. 
 
6.42  So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.  
 Propositions can express nothing that is higher. 
 
Wittgenstein here claims that the very sense of the world lies outside it, in other 
words, the very concept an individual has about the world is a transcendental matter. 
But this sense, by being transcendental, cannot be put (logically) into words. The 
same happens with values, and questions about the ethical relation of actions and 
their consequences.  
 
6.43  If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can 
alter only the limits of the world, not the facts –not what can be 
expressed by means of language.  
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether 
different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.  
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the 
unhappy man. 
 
6.431  So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end. 
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What is particularly interesting here is the turning towards a more subjectivist view, 
in the sense that the world becomes an individual experience, a part of the very self. 
The transcendental, while lying outside the world, has the capacity to shape and to 
alter it, to the extent of molding it in a completely distinctive fashion for the way an 
individual experiences it. In this sense reality has a moral dimension where every 
individual experiences a particular individual reality, which is in turn a manifestation 
of the persons will and ethical conduct. In this way these individual realities, and thus 
the world, do vanish at death. 
 
Here one can see the connection between the logical, the ethical and the will as 
transcendental elements shaping the world. That transcendental elements shape 
reality can be proved, by looking into the functioning’s of logic, which makes itself 
manifest in reality, its representations and their relations. This can be clearly studied 
through scientific methods, as shown by Wittgenstein throughout Tractatus. What 
does not become possible for him is to scientifically, or meaningfully, demonstrate 
how the rest of the transcendental aspects become manifested. To this he probably 
would have answered: 
 
6.44  It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it 
exists. 
 
In this tone Wittgenstein reduces the so-called problems of philosophy discussed 
above (pg. 27-29) to nonsensicality.  One can talk about the way the world is 
arranged, a matter for natural sciences, but one cannot talk in a meaningful way about 
its nature. Therefore the act of describing how things are in the world is a matter for 
natural sciences, while the actual fact that the world exist cannot be expressed in a 
meaningful manner. In this tone the role and method of philosophy is reduced to 
clarifying and demonstrating what belongs to which realm (TLP 6.53). One could 
certainly ask whether there is any value in reducing the field and role of philosophy 
to a discussion about the logical structure of language.  
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One also cannot help wondering, whether philosophy and logic becomes nonsensical 
once reality is really understood. According to Wittgenstein it would only be 
nonsensical to talk about it.  
Conclusion 
Wittgenstein’s ultimate intentions with Tractatus can be interpreted in different ways, 
depending on what the reader focuses upon. These are as follows:  
 
a) When focusing on the common logical structure shared by language, thought and 
reality, a very objective presentation of reality becomes apparent; the subject does not 
have any influence on how the world is, how it is defined and how it is perceived. 
Thereby this view contrasts, for example, Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) subjectivist 
ontological theories, which present the subject as the center for all perception, and 
thus determining reality, in other words, the mind is seen here as the organizer and 
sculptor of the world.  
Wittgenstein argues instead for an objective reality through the presentation of the 
picture theory, and the way language, thought and reality share a common logical 
structure; they are embedded in a logical, objective dimension, meaning that what 
can be seen, for example, is an accurate image of an object that exist independent 
from the mind perceiving it. 
 
b) On the other hand, by placing logic as such in the dimension of the transcendental 
and by claiming that the world and reality are shaped by transcendental aspects such 
as ethics and the like, Wittgenstein opens up to the idea that anything that could be 
said about the world is a mode to describe it, not the world itself. Like this, the world 
can be seen in many different ways, in the same way an object can be measured using 
many different measuring systems. The result of the measuring process will show one 
way to describe the object, but the object will never be the measure itself. 
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c) It can, however, also be argued that Wittgenstein’s purpose in Tractatus is not to 
discard the mystical, but to draw a clear line between what can be talked about (in a 
logical manner) and what cannot. By separating the transcendental realm and the 
logical realm, Wittgenstein tries to set his reader free from the “illusion” that the two 
are intertwined, in order to open up for a new way of dealing with both: Not only 
what can be said, but also what cannot be said. In this context Tractatus can be read 
as not only an attempt to map the logical but also an attempt to deal with how all that 
which does not belong to the logical realm should be treated. In this manner 
Wittgenstein transforms an ontological problem into an epistemological one. In other 
words, not looking into the manner in which phenomena exist, but how they should 
be dealt with, studied and understood. 
 
Following our reading process, and in the light of our field of interest and problem 
definition, we find this last conclusion the one that denotes the most central and 
significant aspects and claims of Tractatus. This is because it complements the two 
first conclusions, in the sense that it harmonizes the objectivist aspect of the book 
with the transcendental aspect. The existence of transcendental phenomena does not 
refute the logical principles of validity, proof and inference, and the fact that through 
reasoning one can conclude truths and thereby achieve knowledge about a fact. In the 
same way the validity of logical methods cannot refute the transcendental.  
They co-exist as part of a whole, in the same manner as the two sides of a coin do. 
They are different but yet serve in constituting, and belong to, one reality. 
Wittgenstein’s aim is to show how to deal with this seeming paradox. 
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Chapter III 
Philosophical Investigations 
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Introduction 
In the following Wittgenstein’s strong criticism of ‘the old tradition of language and 
philosophy’ will be dealt with. This criticism also includes Wittgenstein’s thoughts 
and ideas in his earlier work Tractatus.  
An interpretation will follow, containing treatment of the main concepts in 
Philosophical Investigations and thereby treatment of how Wittgenstein 
conceptualizes language and its relation to thoughts and the world. The new view on 
language naturally leads to a shift of the role of philosophy, which will be looked 
into.  
In the latter part an examination is done of how meaning is seen to arise in language, 
as presented in Philosophical Investigations. Ensuing this, socialization is stressed in 
the relation to the concept of language games. Finally we will conclude in order to 
connect the above mentioned concepts and discussions, thereby making the relation 
apparent in an effort to capture the essence of Philosophical Investigation.    
 
Philosophical Investigations was published posthumously in 1953, originally in 
German. It was a book that Wittgenstein (according to himself) had worked on for 16 
years.  
 
After the publication of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein stopped to concern himself with 
philosophy and became an elementary school teacher in several small towns in 
Austria. This could be deemed reasonable as he believed to have solved all essential 
philosophical problems in his work Tractatus. But that was not his motivation for 
giving up philosophy. In a letter to his mother Wittgenstein wrote that he would do 
no more philosophy, not because he was bored, but because his mind was no longer 
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flexible; he wrote that no one can do more than five or teen years of good work of 
philosophy17 (Wittgenstein’s work on Tractatus took seven).  
 
One can debate if Wittgenstein really stopped thinking philosophically in these years. 
It is more likely that Wittgenstein continued thinking about philosophical matters and 
language, while being affected by the function as a school teacher and participating 
in the normal society, wherein he investigated further on language and discovered 
new dimensions of it. In 1929 Wittgenstein went back to Cambridge and had 
fundamentally different and new philosophical ideas on his mind. 
Grounds for Renewal  
Wittgenstein writes the following in the preface to Philosophical Investigations: 
 
“Four years ago I had the occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly 
seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones 
together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only in contrast with 
and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning 
to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been 
forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book.” 
 
Philosophical Investigations can be seen on its own; but the author believes that 
Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations complement each other. Furthermore 
Philosophical Investigations contains a comparison to Tractatus, which is done 
explicitly in the text as a dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor, a  point that will be 
dealt with later. 
 
                                         
17
 A letter to Wittgenstein’s mother dated September 20th, 1923. Included in von Hayek’s 
Unfinished sketch.  
 39 
According to Moore, Wittgenstein said in a lecture that it was foremost with regard to 
his concept of elementary propositions and their connections with truth-functions that 
it had been necessary for him to reconsider his ideas; He pointed out that he had 
produced no examples of elementary propositions and that this fact indicated that his 
early theory was, to some extend, flawed. His view at the time of the lecture (1930-
33) was that it was senseless to talk of a ‘final’ analysis. Specific criticism of 
Tractatus was not given until the composition of Philosophical Investigations.18 
Wittgenstein realized that his earlier views, presented in Tractatus were; “not a result 
of investigation: it was a requirement”. (PI §107).  
 
Throughout his later work, Tractatus serves as the pre-eminent grounds for renewal. 
In Tractatus there is a strict purpose: To reveal the logic in language, which in this 
sense is something that can be done by showing what can be said and therefore in 
turn what cannot.  
 
One finds in Philosophical Investigations a more humble narrative. Language is use 
and meaning is not fixed; it manifests itself through whatever usage and what 
language game the users are ‘playing’. This later Wittgenstein acknowledges the 
communicational versatility of language, the meaning of words and sentences come 
about through the way they are being used, use and meaning is what the participants 
in a communicative act find it to be at particular moments in their conversation or in 
their language games, therefore meaning is constructed in relation to the use and 
context. Words and sentences are atomic or composite, all according to how they 
function in their respective use within a language game. 
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Contesting Traditional Philosophy of Language 
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein realizes that the doctrine of Tractatus 
rested on a ‘particular picture’ of what human language is. The critique of the 
cardinal idea in Tractatus, is that it does not consider the dynamics of language in its 
analysis. 
Wittgenstein regards the “method and doctrines of Tractatus as a paradigm of 
traditional philosophy” (Fann, 1969: 55). A great part of Philosophical Investigations 
is directed against this old conception of language, as represented by St. Augustine. 
This point of view, Wittgenstein found, was shared by many other renowned 
philosophers, but he targeted St. Augustine because “the conception must be 
important if so great a mind held it” (Fann, 1969: 53). St. Augustine, among others, 
assumed that the mastery of language consisted in learning the names of the objects. 
It was generally assumed that the ostensive definition is the fundamental act by 
which a meaning of a word is given; words are names and each name has a meaning 
in the concrete world. This sums up the essentials of the former tradition, which was 
also present in Wittgenstein’s’ earlier work Tractatus. 
 
It is Wittgenstein’s believe that St. Augustine’s narrative is a useful description (PI § 
1), but he is also of the conviction that this way of presenting language in philosophy, 
only describes a very small part of what language is. He sees St. Augustine’s 
statement as a simplification of the capabilities and the capacity language has: “That 
philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way 
language functions” (PI § 2). He states that what St. Augustine sees is like only 
explaining how the pieces are placed on the board, when describing what it is to play 
chess, similar to trying to explain one board game in an effort to describe the concept 
game as a unified whole (PI §3). Wittgenstein points out, that for many words in 
language there do not seem to be ostensive definitions, because one cannot point 
towards the object they represent in the physical world. 
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As mention earlier Philosophical Investigations uses an interlocutor that asserts the 
old notions of language and notions from his former work Tractatus, on some 
occasions, while on other occasions the interlocutor questions statements made in 
Philosophical Investigations itself. All in all the chancing interlocutor represents a 
more simple view of language, it is a somewhat naive voice, which Wittgenstein uses 
to illuminate problems by bringing contrasting views to its assertion: 
 
If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will 
perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: ”What is a question?”[…] (PI § 
24), 
 
[…]It is not true that you must already be master of language in order to 
understand an ostensive definition: all you need -- of course! – is to know 
or guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to. […] And if I 
ask how that is done, you will say you concentrated your attention on the 
colour, the shape, etc. But I ask again: how is that done? (PI § 33) 
 
“We name things and then we can talk about them: can refer to them in 
talk.” –As if what we did next were given with the mere act of naming. […] 
(PI § 27) 
  
This employment of an interlocutor is meant, by Wittgenstein, to show discuss the 
old tradition of philosophy of language; the interlocutor is also use as a means to 
criticize this old philosophy for not understanding the diversity of language and not 
sufficiently recognizing language as being in extent the activity of language games: 
 
One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. Viz, 
to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, 
etc. .To repeat-naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One 
can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But what is it a 
preparation for? (PI §26) 
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Method Embedded in Structure and Style    
To some extent the structure and style of Philosophical Investigations mirrors 
Wittgenstein’s method to describe language. It reflects his mode of argumentation, 
which is an effort to get closer to the concept of language and to the question of how 
meaning arises. Moreover, the structure and style of Philosophical Investigations 
reveal Wittgenstein’s change in attitude towards language and philosophy.  
 
Philosophical Investigations consists of a preface followed by two parts; the preface 
is written by Wittgenstein himself where he shortly presents topics, motivation and 
style. The first part consists of 693 numbered aphorisms and the second part consists 
of fourteen remarks, systemized by Roman numerals. Wittgenstein’s aphorisms are 
of different lengths and reflect on a wide range of topics, with only few clearly stated 
conclusions. The aphorisms partly contain questions, to which Wittgenstein seems to 
provide no answers and partly analogies, whose point the reader cannot immediately 
see.  
Philosophical Investigations has an unusual structure and it is very dissimilar in 
composition to the one appearing in Tractatus which aimed to appear mathematically 
and logically structured. Wittgenstein did not choose the overall structure of 
Philosophical Investigations, it was G.E.M Anscomble and R. Rhees who published 
it after his death; the second part of Philosophical Investigations consists of notes 
written by Wittgenstein, which the publishers believed that the latter would not 
himself have embedded in his work, because they were not finished (PI Editor’s 
Note). Because of this fact, it is difficult to look into Wittgenstein’s motivation for 
using this structure and writing style and to find out if the second part of the book is 
consistent in its context and its chosen chronology of the chapters. However, one 
seemingly prudent way to read and understand Philosophical Investigations is to, 
while reading it, bear in mind the way he structures the first part, in addition to the 
way he himself presents the idea behind it:  
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I have written down all these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, of 
which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while 
I sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another.  
(PI Preface). 
 
Wittgenstein imagined different ways the first part of the book could be structured 
and written, but this form was natural to him; a form, where his thoughts naturally 
and plain move from one theme to another: 
 
-The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of 
sketches of landscape which were made in the course of these long and 
involved journeyings. (PI Preface)  
 
It is worth noticing that the rhetoric maintained in Philosophical Investigations, 
sustains what it itself promotes, namely the use of different writing styles and 
methods for argumentation as set forth in aphorism 109 and in 126;  
 
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, 
and description alone must take its place. (PI §109) 
 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. –Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain. (PI §126) 
 
It is the multiplicity of language use, that makes Wittgenstein’s writing style take 
different directions and this is not coincidental; his argument for not using the same 
method as in his earlier work goes as follows: 
 
The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; 
you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot 
breathe. –Where does that idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on 
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our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us 
to take them off. (PI §103) 
  
Wittgenstein’s aim is to expose patterns in language. His method is not to state or 
convince but let the description speak for itself.  
 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states that meaning is use. One 
consequence of this belief is that it is important to reveal and describe the use of 
language, opposed to setting up a set of rules under which language functions. With 
this changed attitude it, for instance, becomes more interesting to Wittgenstein; that 
the grocer knows how the words are used and thereby can get meaning out of 
conversations in different situations (PI §1). In contrast to being interested in, the 
notion that the grocer knows what ‘two’ and ‘apples’ are referring to; the grocer must 
know and have learned ‘something’ more; a kind of agreement to manage in using 
and understanding ‘two’ and ‘apples’. This ‘something’ is what Wittgenstein tries to 
expose.  
 
In contrast to Tractatus, where Wittgenstein has a specific method, which he then 
claims, can be used to understand the functions of language, Philosophical 
Investigations presents a completely different view on how language should be 
studied. Wittgenstein calls his method “the descriptive method” (Husted, 2000: 87).  
Language Games 
Languages games are introduced in aphorism 7:  “[…] I shall also call the whole, 
consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, a “language-game””. 
Hence the motivation for using this term is to capture this variety and complexity, 
thereby making it possible to locate where meaning emerges from. The concept  of 
language games cannot be taken out of their context or be delimited by clear 
boundaries, because Wittgenstein states that language games are supposed to 
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emphasize that talking a language is to be a part of an activity or form of life (PI 
§23). 
He mentions different examples of what language games can be, with the intention of 
giving the reader an illustration of what is meant by language game and thereby 
showing the multiplicity and variety of language: 
 
“[...] Giving orders, and obeying them- 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)- 
Reporting an event- 
Speculating about the event- 
Forming and testing a hypothesis_ 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams- 
Making up a story; and reading it- 
Play-acting- 
Singing catches- 
Guessing riddles- 
Making a joke; telling it- 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic- 
Translating from one language to another- 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying[…]”  (PI §23) 
 
Language games are related to each other and overlap each other (PI §66), 
Wittgenstein compares them to various games: board-games, card-games, ball-games 
etc. There are certain similarities within these games; the question is which 
similarities:  
 
[…]For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to 
all [...] but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that 
(P.I. §66).  
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Language games are interrelated in the same way as families, held together by family 
resemblances, meaning that family members have comparable characteristics (PI 
§67). 
Rule Governed Activity  
Wittgenstein perceives language as a rule governed practice: “to speak a language is 
to take part in a rule governed activity” (PI §7). Wittgenstein renders rules as being a 
practical following of rules, it is not particular rules, they are undefined (PI §201).  
Words and sentences have to be part of a rule-governed activity of language games. 
To know the words is not sufficient, if one does not know how to use them; the rules 
are embedded in the use of words.  
When you explain a word, you explain how to use it; its possible meaning, thereby 
there must be a normative set of rules that is followed. Even though meaning is use, 
there must be conventions in order for there to be understanding of words at all. In 
extent this means that the vocabulary available is the same across language games. 
Still the attached meaning to words in language games must be in linked together, 
because they convey meaning to the preconditioned conventions (vocabulary 
available). To follow the rules it is to know which language games to use in different 
situations. Language game is a set of activities defined by certain rules, namely the 
rules that govern all the various uses of language and which enables the participants 
to understand what each other mean in conversations. It is by these implicit rules that 
communication between human is established. Additionally, people follow rules even 
though they are not aware of it. ”When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule 
blindly.” (PI §219). 
Language is to Master a Technique 
The ability to follow rules Is seen as an ability to master a technique. “To understand 
a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be 
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master of a technique” (PI § 199). When learning a language, however, one does not 
only learn one technique, but a complex set of techniques.  
 
Teaching someone how to follow rules is to teach him a technique. A technique is to 
be able to engage in a practice. As an example; a girl can be a good dancer, without 
being able to explain how she dances. Wittgenstein perceives the knowledge of 
language in a similar way; to be able to talk, is to know how to do something in 
practice. The knowledge one uses to understand a word, does not have to be a defined 
knowledge, it is a practical knowledge. It is, however, important to state that this 
knowledge can beome theoretical if the users reflect upon the knowledge.  
 The Private Language Argument 
The English born philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) claimed that we can use 
words as names of our private thoughts in order to remember them. It was possible, 
according to him, to have a private language – to have words oneself could ‘mark’ 
private thoughts or emotions with. Wittgenstein objected to this by noticing that it 
was in fact impossible to do just that. His question sounded: how is it possible to gain 
certainty on the recognition of those private thoughts or emotions (Appiah, 2003:11-
13). In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein devotes much of his attention to 
this discussion and its connected argumentation. Throughout the book the discussion 
of inner experiences and their connection to utterances is brought. This goes on to 
reveal that language-use and the attached meanings to it are embedded in peoples 
ongoing word exchange, where the emphasis and conciliated meanings of those 
words in unity, and on their own, continuously evolves/changes – all in accordance to 
which language games gets to be vehicle for that exchange, at a given time.  
 
In the following, aphorisms and statements from part two of Philosophical 
Investigations – considered prudent to emphasize on in this debate – are examined in 
an effort to clarify on the specificities purporting to the non-existence of a private 
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language, and connected issues to that matter and noticing from those elucidation, the 
remedies made on the conceptualization of language and its function.  
Following a Rule and Comparing Inner Experiences 
It is not possible that one human being only once followed a rule. It is something, 
which is done within language, not once and for all, and it is not the only thing. It is 
part of the technique, which is language (PI §199). 
 
As mention before rule and conduct go together. To interpret a rule freely is to give 
the word rule a whole new meaning; we do this when we say that we can act opposite 
to the rule (PI §201). We replace the essence of a word with something else. To 
follow a rule is a practicality. It is not private, because then one had to assume to be 
following it, which is not the same thing (PI §202). If it is not possible to follow a 
rule privately, what does that then say about the rule of recognizing own 
experiences/emotions? 
 
When people, for instance, recall something, the generating activity is an internal 
process. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein tends to deny that this is a useful way to picture 
the act of recalling. It is much more effective to refer to what it amounts to in 
practice. Though people might recognize their own feelings/experiences as being 
internal and from their own “soul” and/or mind, the nature of these, and the 
connected proper use of words in language describing them, remains an enigma. 
Inner activity has to have some disposition for measurement or differentiation to have 
its significance revealed – how should that be granted? Behaviorism does not 
ascertain the significance; neither does it make ones own experiences of, for instance, 
pain the object of comparison. Because to be demonstrating forged pain to oneself is 
to be demonstrating privately, and that is an illusion in Wittgenstein’s opinion (PI 
§304 - 314). 
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Wittgenstein’s argument then is: That rules cannot be applied privately and inner 
experiences have no basis for comparison, therefore making private language 
impossible because there is no rule to apply and to ratify the coherence between 
experiences. No way to tell one from the other: 
 
We have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored 
medium. (PI § 308) 
 
This amounts to saying that there is a process (soul process) and its medium, but their 
nature does not make way for coming to sound conclusions on whether one 
experience resembles the other in a totally private manner; i.e. it is not possible to 
mark private experiences with private words coherently, as they might not be the 
same at different times; the measurement of being ‘same’ is missing.  
Sameness, Atmosphere of Words and Non-language 
In aphorism 378 Wittgenstein writes that if a person has two different inner pictures 
that are the same, then the word same must describe that recognition and, in extent, to 
be describing a recognition of sameness, one must be able also to describe it without 
using the word same. This comes from the fact that the person must be aware of the 
equivalence before using the word, ergo deriving his conclusion on it from other 
definitions of equivalence of the inner pictures.  
 
Continuing on the same notion – of something preceding a word – Wittgenstein states 
that in the crossing over from the perception of something to its corresponding word 
there are no rules to apply – as to say, “it just happens”.  
 
I could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen to 
words. Here the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution of 
their use is lacking. (PI §380) 
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The very fabric of conception is prior to the words, there is no way to point to it 
directly, but only to the words produced, the link remains a mystery. Hence there is 
no way (for now) of telling for sure one experience from another, by thought, or to 
differentiate between two or assert their equivalence. Wittgenstein does not state this 
but leaves it as a question unanswered (PI §378 – 383).  
 
In chapter VI, part two, Wittgenstein returns to this question by examining what it is 
that makes for a certain mental atmosphere in using of a word. Why are there no 
criteria for emotions and their connection to language? Is there for instance an ‘if’ 
emotion? Wittgenstein asserts that there is not. The reasoning for this being that the 
word ‘if’ can have various meanings – and thereby also have different impingements 
mentally – all according to what context it is in, and therefore gets its essence from. 
Wittgenstein believes it to be slightly wrong to have this conception of words such as 
‘if’, the other-way-around is much more fruitful; to see it in the light of its 
circumstance and not as a stable concept providing the same emotion throughout 
contexts. Adding to that, Wittgenstein claims that it is possible, as well, to have the 
‘if – emotion’ when there is no ‘if’ articulated, saying that this particular emotion is 
not granted to this word alone, but that there are a certain emotional “atmosphere” 
which appears ever so often to people mentally, and can sometimes be connected to 
the word ‘if’. 
 
What was prior to the words, and without them, that made them emerge? (PI §330-
336) Wittgenstein’s answer to this is quite frank: In language like in games, for 
instance chess, one has no way of intending to do something without knowing the 
games (the chess game) and their techniques, rules, etc. The same goes for language 
and its use: One has to know a language before having non-language intentions on 
how to use it in a certain way, in a certain situation. And getting to know a language 
is to observe how the words are used (PI §336 – 340). 
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So if it was possible to make a comparison of inner experiences it had to be made on 
the basis of an uncertain atmosphere which is conjured from the context, something 
which precedes a word, something non-linguistic, the beforehand non-language 
emotion constituting its rightful use. Still, when it is not certain when those 
beforehand emotions make for the use of a word, it gets extraordinary difficult, or 
rather; impossible to say for certain. 
A Beetle in a Box  
If there is no private language, then everything uttered concerning one’s own 
experiences and thoughts, can by definition, also be uttered publicly. Nevertheless, 
still remaining as a problem is that the thing, which a person`s utterance concerns 
itself with, is hidden – the emotion is private. 
 
People might, even if it is not verifiable, differ in the meanings they attach to certain 
experiences. (PI §272) How is it then possible to, part of the time to be referring to 
ones inner definition of something, and at other times be referring to the commonly 
known definition of the same phenomenon? (PI §277) Again it depends on how one 
uses the words, the problem is that when one utters something concerning intrinsic 
events how can that not, at the same time be an announcement of something else? 
 
The problem confronted here is one of solipsism. How can we know with certainty 
what others mean when they speak of private experiences? Wittgenstein believes that 
we cannot. It would be as if each person had a “beetle in a box” and uttered 
something about it, without letting anybody look in the box. It is hopeless to have 
certainty – it leads to skepticism (PI §293). One way to make the paradox of 
utterances referring to other people’s experiences disappear, is to dismiss the idea 
that our language functions in one specific way and always serves the same purpose: 
to communicate thoughts. This perception of language is wrong, because it functions 
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so differently according to what is stressed at a given moment e.g.: houses, pain, 
good and bad, or whatever the case might be. (PI §304) 
 
In chapter VIII, part two, Wittgenstein stresses this conundrum again. In summary he 
sets forth the following: To explain one’s emotions is difficult if not impossible. It 
might be possible to explain emotions by sufficiently elaborating on them through 
language. However, real certainty is hard to achieve because there is, to a certain 
extent, always something more to clarify. Doubt can continuously be raised on how 
similarly, people discussing it understand the emotion.  
 
The close relationship between `saying inwardly` and `saying` is 
manifested in the possibility of telling out loud what one say inwardly, and 
of an outward action’s accompanying inward speech.(PI: 187) 
 
In Wittgenstein’s terms the only ‘peep-hole’ people have to the inner experiences of 
others is their language and action. Inner language then is possible to know. How 
then about certainty of the meaning of inner experiences, non-language ones? 
Levels of Certainty 
 
The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game.(PI: 191) 
 
This means that the criteria for certainty on what goes on within others’ minds is, as 
noted, defined through the use of language games and what is set by that to be 
sufficient to act as knowledge.  
 
It can in conclusion be said that knowledge on others’ inner experiences – according 
to the parts of Philosophical Investigation dealt with here – is a form of ongoing ever 
changing guesswork that finds its answers more or less vivid and certain depending 
on which language game is enacted. 
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Form of Life 
Wittgenstein uses this term five times explicitly in Philosophical Investigations, in 
somewhat different contexts throughout, some notions on it make way for the same 
claim – bring the same essence to the term, and others invite to different 
interpretations of what they could entail.  
 
Taking a closer look at what constitutes this difference, is made in the following, in 
the effort to gain greater clarity on this term and to make sense of how the term might 
be construing the meaning of its connected context differently. This reveals important 
because, in addition to the explicit references to form of life, Philosophical 
Investigations also touches upon the concept in various other places, making its 
proper conceptualization essential for understanding those sections of Philosophical 
Investigations properly, and also the book as a whole. 
 
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. (PI: 190) 
 
This quote could state with affirmation that it is not pertinent to assign the same 
capacity, flexibility to a human being as to a lion. Claiming that by devotion to reach 
an understanding of a foreign culture, people, in contrast to lions, understand each 
others culture and therefore also the people and their ways of acting on the meanings 
they designate to utterances. 
 
[…] they [the animals] do not use language – if we except the most 
primitive forms of language. - Commanding, questioning, storytelling, 
chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, 
drinking, and playing. (PI §25) 
 
This line of argumentation could by referring to aphorism 25 assign the lion-analogy 
some less literally interpreted meaning. Because, as stated here, humans can not fail 
to understand each other to the same degree as they had failed to understand a lion. 
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The lion thought experiment can perhaps make for a useful contrast to illuminate how 
different people can be; totally different in all aspects, but that does not make it 
impossible for people to be able to understand each other. Still, the lion - if it is a real 
life lion – would never, as noted, be able to utilize the imaginative resources which 
human society and culture grant to the human individual, making possible a 
comprehension of people different from it. The human being can, by this mode of 
argumentation, come to understand all other humans because they are inherently the 
same, the same form of life. The concept would then be a matter of division between 
human form of life and animal, plant (or other – extraterrestrial perhaps) form of life. 
 
Another way of interpreting the concept form of life is by arguing that the lion 
proposition, by annexing the claim that if people visit a strange country with different 
traditions from their own values and ways of conceiving the world, they do not 
understand the people in that country or culture. Wittgenstein claims that it is because 
people cannot find their feet with those people (PI: 90). They are not alike; 
nevertheless it is still possible for them to know what the people from the other 
country say intrinsically to themselves. 
The most apparent interpretation of this is that one can know what a foreigner is 
thinking; his conceptualization of the words and their joint meaning in the context. 
All the same, it still remains enigmatic what the foreigner makes of what to do with 
that held meaning – how he puts it to further use. A proposition has the possibility to 
be grasped similarly by the two, i.e. the multiple choice selection they have at their 
disposal to approach its meaningfulness, is in essence the same, but caused by them 
being different minded, it might yield different ensuing actions or utterances. This 
supports an interpretation which renders forms of life as something that varies across 
cultures different in grounding patterns of acts, needs, reactions, feelings, ways of 
expression, ways of thinking and ways to conceive the world. 
This interpretation stands its ground through a reasoning which proposes that the 
passage concerning the lion and its given position immediately after the section 
concerning cultural differences can be caused by its surrounding context, understood 
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as having the same claim as the former passage. The claim being, that it is impossible 
to understand a talking lion’s intentions, further actions, etc. based on its utterances, 
which also is the case with people from different cultures, context, history etc. This 
sort of difference is a difference in form of life.   
 
 
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what 
is false?” – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they 
agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in 
form of life. (PI §241) 
 
The contingency elucidated in the last sentence of this above quote has the possibility 
of being interpreted in more than one way as well; it could be conceived to state that 
agreement is something which gets settled within a form of life, the human form of 
life. There is only one human form of life, and any agreement on the truth or falsity 
of utterances, get settled within it, and that is what makes it a form of life; which in 
extent could be labeled as a universal human form of life. 
  
Yet another interpretation could be that it was an agreement on how to correlate 
several different human forms of life. Making form of life a concept of multiple 
instances, and the truth or falsity of what people say or agree on dependant on which 
forms of life they enact. This sort of reasoning would include several – according to 
what is deemed pertinent – categories that entail differentiation in what to agree on, 
and what to say, and how. One such category could be culture, in the sense that 
culture is what stands as grounds for deviating conceptualization. In addition to the 
difference and similarities that the cultures of countries have, more personally, people 
could deem their equivalence in opinions coming from their engagement in the same 
activities, hobbies or work as constituting forms of life, the agreement in opinions 
and truth and falsity on some matters, coming from this common interest could on 
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one hand be considered cross – cultural and cross – linguistic. On the other hand it 
might be considered to reside differently in different cultures.   
 
A ‘meaning-making’ connection between activities could also exist. Some features of 
a country’s culture or language might intervene or enhance communication between 
the cultural different people undertaking an activity together, overlapping, in a sense, 
in the making of meaning. The opposite would also be possible, namely that the 
activities could purport to joint conceptualization when people undertake it, e.g. the 
jargon connected to an activity across cultures could promote accordance in how to 
contemplate the truth and falsity of matters, effecting upon the way a person usually 
arrives at conclusions concerning truth and falsity within his/hers culture. In 
elaboration, people might agree through the activities they take part in on matters 
they would otherwise not agree upon if they did not take part in that activity or form 
of life. 
 
In summary, the discussion up until now has set forth several interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s term form of life:  
 
• One form of life embracing the entire human race. This could be named the 
biological interpretation, as it draws the limit between forms of life, where the 
limit between species can be drawn. 
• Culturally bounded form of life. An anthropological interpretation of form of 
life that defines its limit as the limit between cultures. 
• Form of life as activities. In this interpretation of the concept, the limit 
between different forms of life is drawn, not on basis of biological or cultural 
similarities, but on similarities in activities or lifestyle, e.g. hooligans around 
the world may be said to share one form of life. 
• Form of life as agreement in opinions. Here several individuals can share a 
form of life by sharing opinions, as for example political ones. 
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• A personal form of life. Here one could, for instance, imagine a pair of 
siblings creating their own, shared language – thus sharing a form of life. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that different forms of life are related in the same 
manner as language games; they are connected by family resemblances. This leads to 
yet another interpretation of the concept, namely that the individual can be part of 
various forms of life at the same time: 
 
• Form of life as sharing family resemblances. Here each individual can be 
part of several forms of life. One could, for example, imagine an individual 
sharing one part of life with her girlfriend (the personal), one with the 
members of her chess club (the activity based) and one with the entire human 
race (the biological). 
  
The first interpretation mentioned above might conform to this mode of reasoning to 
some extent, but does not view having family resemblance as being forms of life. 
Rather it would ratify it as resemblances, not of form of life, but of language games 
connected to activities and cultures or other non-language realms for negotiating 
meaning. It would see this continuous effort to be part of the universal human form 
of life, to be a defining feature of it, not as something granting a notion of several 
human forms of life. 
 
The anthropological interpretation if compared to the biological one, would assert, 
according to aphorism 25, that if a lion should come into consideration as having 
similarities to humans, it had to be able to reach conclusions on truth and falsity by 
the same means as humans; having all these human traits would given reasons to 
raise doubt on whether it still was reasonable to conceive it as a lion. 
 
As a concluding remark the discussion can be brought in relation to the assertion that 
there exists no private language and that all language must be public, then it must 
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mean that people cannot ‘invent’ new words without rules or without negotiating it 
with other people. Hence what foregrounds the words is a common nature, a common 
form of life, granting the meanings of the words. And if this goes for one language in 
one culture, it must also be the case in another, because after all if people are born 
into a culture they are able to understand it and its way of distinguishing between 
false and true. This supports the interpretation, which claims that there is a universal 
human form of life. However it only holds if human form of life is supposed to entail 
the capabilities for comprehension all human beings contain at infanthood, and not 
the difference in the way they later come to conceptualize the world. 
 
The problem of gaining clarity on the concept of form of life, and its many 
interpretations has on one hand something to do with, that Wittgenstein does not 
elaborate to full extent on what it means, and the varying and different uses he puts 
the term to. Wittgenstein does not explain the specificities of the term, but preferably 
lets it get its meaning from the context.  
 
“But is a blurred concept a concept at all?” – Is an indistinct photograph a 
picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an 
indistinctive picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly 
what we need. (PI §71) 
 
So by this it can be seen that Wittgenstein tends to believe that it is a good idea to 
leave a concept blurry to make for a more flexible use of it, still it makes it difficult 
to be sure of how to make further claims on the basis of a proposition containing such 
a concept.  
  
Wittgenstein never indicates that these, or any other, terms could be 
taken alone as the key to philosophical insight; certainly he never gives 
any of them a detailed development. Their very strangeness and variety 
indicate the difficulty and confusion facing someone who would describe 
the process that they were intended to evoke. (Price, 1973: 82) 
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Social Aspects of Language in Form of Life 
The socialization aspect emerges in many of the concepts in Philosophical 
Investigations: as a consequence of conceiving language as a ruled governed activity, 
and meaning as use and as a consequence of believing that language is embedded in a 
form of life. 
Considering these aspects of language it must be a multifaceted learning process 
when, for example, a child learns to speak. This process is also a matter Wittgenstein 
touches upon many times. One could imagine that a child learns language by hearing 
other people talk and by practicing use. To use the example of the child, it is when 
learning a language that the child at the same time learns a form of life, in which 
language is embedded; ”To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (PI 
§19). This process and the form of life, in which the child is embedded, is what 
makes it capable of understanding and using language. The child can then develop 
this knowledge and come to be able to participate in more complex language games. 
Another facet of the socialization aspect is the meeting point between the norms, the 
language and the form of life: “To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order 
[…], are customs (uses, institutions)” (PI §199) and “Commanding questioning, 
storytelling, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, 
drinking, playing.” (PI §25). Quotes like these point towards the notion that learning 
language grants means to become acculturated, that is, coming to participate in a vast 
network of structured activities that essentially employ language. This link between 
concepts as customs, institutions and our natural history touches upon the notion of 
socialization. Though Wittgenstein never mentions the concept of socialization, it is 
implied in his understanding of language. Wittgenstein presents language and form of 
life as two concepts inextricably linked together; sharing the same form of life makes 
it possible to communicate. 
 
Language is a practical knowledge, and a part of our natural history. How does this 
knowledge, these possibilities that language contains – which are all embedded in 
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situations, actions and atmospheres – get passed on and adopted? According to 
Philosophical Investigation it happens between the users of language, in their shared 
life, and it is through this communication arises. This practical knowledge circulates 
between people; some of it disappears and is replaced by new conventions in 
language. Referring back to Wittgenstein’s metaphor about the city of language, new 
areas arise, depending on what the citizens in the city need (PI §18) – or what tools 
they need (PI §11). Language-use develops in accordance to form of life.  
That Wittgenstein does not focus on the socialization aspect, can seem obscure, 
especially in the light of the fact that he gives a clarification of the vast role that 
communication and socialization play in language. His later works have inspired and 
influenced the future work of pedagogies and sociologists. But in this perspective it is 
important to remember that Wittgenstein, as Moore formulated it, did not state 
definitions on language philosophy, as such. He wanted to inspire, and aimed to solve 
or discuss points in language, which could lead to philosophical puzzles or errors. 
(Fann, 1969: 81). 
 
The Role of Philosophy 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein has chosen to dismiss the notion of 
logic as the common denominator of language, thought and the world. Instead 
meaning, which before came about through logical coherence of these, is rendered as 
coming about through use of words in language games.   
 
What this does to the way the role of philosophy is conceived, is that there are now 
no sets of rules (as logic), no pervasive notion to rectify or promote on. Language has 
become arbitrarily fluctuating, it cannot be captured as such, and philosophy can 
therefore merely describe use of language and thereby meaning.  Use and meaning 
get their connectivity through a negotiation of them by the participants of a language 
game:  
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Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can 
in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It 
leaves everything as it is. (PI §124) 
 
Philosophy can describe the use of language, as noted above, but what does it mean 
to describe use of language? Firstly, it must be noted that Wittgenstein believes there 
are several philosophical methods for this, as can be seen, if aphorism 124 is 
considered in connection to aphorism 133: 
 
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, 
like different therapies. (PI §133) 
 
When Wittgenstein in this way kindles the idea of several methods, he suggests that 
philosophy is an ongoing activity, which cannot have strict guidelines to it, because 
of the ever-changing use of language. The methods can have no firm application 
rules, because language and its use always change. Meaning is namely not fixed and 
therefore cannot be analysed in a fixed manner. 
 
Philosophy is not a cognitive discipline, but an activity, which aims at 
clarity. 19 
 
If philosophy is not a cognitive discipline, ready to use guidelines and theories, how 
does it then make misuse of language apparent as its activity? In Wittgenstein’s 
words the purpose is to: “To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (PI §309). 
Where the “fly” signifies a user of language who is misusing it, creating 
philosophical problems. Misuse of language brings about plain nonsense, which 
philosophy has the role of making apparent, and thereby lead the fly out of the fly-
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bottle. Wittgenstein believes, as mentioned, that there is no possibility to theorize 
this, but is nevertheless giving some clues on how to illuminate this nonsense: 
 
The civil status of contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the 
philosophical problem (PI §125). 
 
Hence, finding contradictions is what the activity of philosophy should concern itself 
with. In aphorism 125 there is a statement, concerning matters of mathematics, that 
says it is important, when it comes to contradictions, to get a clear view of the state 
before the resolve of a contradiction. If this is brought into the above quoted context, 
it means that the role philosophy plays is to make vivid the troubling state of affairs 
which precedes a contradiction. Hence, the clue Wittgenstein is offering, on how to 
enact philosophy’s role is to show the troubling state of affairs as it was before it led 
to the making of a contradiction. However, it cannot be exemplified or theorized how 
to take on such activity, because of the multiplicity of use and variety of language 
games. Thus, it gives one guideline of sound conduct, namely to rectify 
contradictions in language games emerging from misuse of language, as a result of 
the replacement of meaning with nonsense. In Philosophical Investigations the role 
of philosophy is, both to describe actual use of language and therefore also meaning, 
and to illuminate contradictions that lead to nonsense and therefore the traditional 
philosophical problems.   
Meaning is Use 
Wittgenstein’s main thesis in Philosophical Investigations is: “the meaning of a word 
is its use in the language” (PI §43).  
This leads to the question: what is use of a word? As noted before in this chapter; 
language games hold the key to the meaning of words and sentences, since they are 
constructed in an ongoing negotiation between the participants. The question then is: 
How can this negotiated use, which philosophy can only describe, say about how 
meaning arises?   
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We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday 
language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything 
alike. (PI: 191)  
 
In other words there is no reference system to understand all words in all context and 
language games. In addition to this, to mean something is essentially private: 
 
But isn’t our meaning it that gives sense to the sentence? (…) And 
`meaning it` is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also 
something private! It is the intangible something; only comparable to 
consciousness itself. (PI §358) 
 
This means in summary; that if meaning is use and meaning is private, while 
language is public, then what is meant privately and understood privately has no 
means for verification of it getting understood in the same way by others in public 
language. So meaning in use cannot be asserted, only guessed. Only assumed 
agreement can be reached, by people in a language game. Their language seems to 
be in accord with what they individually mean, but there is no certainty of it. 
 
Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a special 
form of the question “How do you mean?” The answer is a contribution to 
the grammar of the proposition. (PI §353) 
 
Common grounds for meaning in use of words and sentences can, according to 
Wittgenstein, be made more apparent indefinitely by elaboration, but never to a full 
extent. 
 
In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side roads. 
We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, 
because it is permanently closed. (PI §426) 
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Meaning is this ‘straight highway’ which cannot entirely be communicated in itself 
– and therefore not have its quintessence captured. Because the receiver draws his 
conclusions from uttered propositions, while not being certain of his own aligned 
meaning, because that is not what the utterance concerns.  
 
[…] What about my own case: how do I myself recognise my own 
disposition? –Here it will have been necessary for me to take notice of 
myself as others do, to listen to myself talking, to be able to draw 
conclusions from what I say! 
 
My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people’s.  
(PI: 163) 
 
It can be concluded that meaning, as perceived in Philosophical Investigations does 
not arise from the relation between world and language in a fixed manner. Words do 
not, as such, gain their meaning by being representations of physical objects or states 
of affairs in reality. Neither is meaning produced solely by the intentions of speaker, 
rather it comes about through an inter-subjectively shared knowledge that enables us 
to use and understand language; meaning is given from the context in which a word 
and sentences are used, it is this inter-subjective agreement, situated in various 
language games, that determines the meaning of a word; meaning is not fixed, but 
varies according to which language game it is used in. Language games make for the 
setting where the elaboration on certain meanings takes place, a setting ,which limits 
and expand its notion.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter the three main concepts in Philosophical Investigations – language 
games, private language argument and form of life – have been dealt with. 
Furthermore they are intertwined in a way, that makes it difficult to fully understand 
one, if one does not understand the others: Firstly, the private language argument 
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purports to the notion of language games, because its argument leads to the notion 
that language is only public. Next, language games render language as essentially a 
communicational device where the accordance is one of form of life. Finally form of 
life has its connection to the private language argument, as it would not be possible to 
have a form of life if there were a private language.  
The role of philosophy has been rendered and its connection to the concepts touched 
upon, which revealed that the role entails only to describe use of language, and by 
that clarify on misuse of language.  
Grounds for meaning in Philosophical Investigations were considered and the futility 
of capturing meaning within language games where meaning is use.    
 Structure and style in Philosophical Investigations revealed a connection to 
Wittgenstein’s method – he practices what he preaches – he is only describing, not 
defining. 
 
In Philosophical Investigations one can never be sure of the limits or certainty of the 
concepts, as there is not given any clear answers to this, this especially is the case for 
language games and form of life. But, on the other hand, Wittgenstein’s purpose of 
Philosophical Investigations was not to give the answer to the reader, but to get the 
reader to think by herself. (PI Preface) 
 
Another subject dealt with in Philosophical Investigation is the emphasis on the 
social world and the communication between people. When meaning arises through 
the use of language, the realm of language becomes communication and thereby a 
social phenomenon that is adopted and evolved through human history. Language is a 
condition for human life; we exist in language and we use, evolve and learn to live on 
a common ground, by it. 
 
[…] Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a 
sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we need? […] (§71) 
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The concepts of language games and form of life are, as mentioned above, not  
clearly defined. It is, however, when seeing the differences and similarities in the 
description of them that they become understandable. They are indistinct, brought in 
various nuances to conceive them more clearly. Also the descriptions themselves 
come in nuances to serve the same purpose. 
  
The purpose of Philosophical Investigations is to describe and expose language and 
not to create theories or logical methods of it. Meaning is not fixed and the modes of 
using language games are endless. There are no clear or defined answers to questions 
of language, as it is everywhere and cannot be looked upon because we are all in it. 
Wittgenstein’s investigation is in a sense finalized, if the purpose was, as mentioned 
above; not to define or theorize, but to exemplify description and bring concepts into 
being, which might be indistinct but which nevertheless offer guidelines to 
description of language and therefore improve its use and make nonsense dissolve, 
especially philosophical nonsense.    
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Chapter IV 
Intersubjectivity and 
 Social Bonding in Language 
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Introduction 
The intention in this chapter will be to bring some aspects of Jürgen Habermas’ 
theory on communicative action in order to give another perspective to Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s notions regarding the status and use of language and, to a certain 
extent, philosophy: The idea will be to investigate, and concentrate upon, the 
socialization aspect of language; its role in binding individuals and organizing groups 
and societies. 
 
The German philosopher and social scientist Jürgen Habermas was born in 
Düsseldorf in 1929 and grew up in a fairly apolitical environment. He did, however, 
experience the Nürnberger trials and the reconstruction of the German democracy 
during his youth, which is believed to have had an impact on the theories he later 
developed. He became known in the beginning of the 1960’s after having studied 
psychology, philosophy, history and German literature at various German 
universities, ending with a doctorate from the university of Marburg in 1961. 
 
Habermas’ own project could be expressed as an attempt to reintroduce certain 
aspects of rationality into the realm of modern society. It is his believe that due to 
capitalistic powers, rationality has in modern society been reduced to a functionalistic 
undertaking, which mostly concerns itself with economical effectiveness. Habermas 
argues that the modern society is not a failure, in contrast; it is a project that has 
never been fully realized, because of this deformation of rationality. Therefore he 
claims that it is necessary to reintroduce other types of rationality in society. He 
examines the terms under which a democratic and free dialogue is possible in the 
modern, industrialized society, in order to find out, which possibilities this modern 
society holds for expanding the role of communication, understood as rational 
conversation based on arguments. One motivation for pursuing this project is, that 
according to Habermas, when one looks at the role of the public and that of the civil 
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citizen in a historical perspective, one finds that modern society has led to a re-
feudalization of the role of the public. The expression, of course, refers back to the 
feudalism known from the Middle Ages, where the general public had no possibility 
for reaching political influence. Habermas’ argument is, that even though there is a 
proportional connection between the modern society and the public as an institution 
capable of influencing and correcting the political system, he believes that the 
transition from a liberal capitalism to a controlled capitalism, where the active parties 
are the state, the powerful private firms, political parties and other organizations, is 
leading towards a society where the public sphere no longer functions as a space 
where the development of opinions and tendencies are constructed or as a corrective 
institution for the societal and political systems, but is merely reduced to a forum 
holding no real power. Habermas’ argument is not that we should attempt a regress to 
an earlier state of this development, as he is well aware of the fact that there has also 
in earlier times been severe difficulties connected to these issues, his theory is rather 
that the present difficulties have arisen from a deformation of the role of the public as 
a consequence of the capitalistic framework under which it has taken place. In this 
sense Habermas does not represent a basically pessimistic view on modern society, 
rather the contrary. It is his believe that through the use of a certain communicative 
form, as presented in his theory of communicative action, it is possible to revitalize 
the role of the public as influential and corrective. 
 
Habermas writes in his Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, that reaching 
understanding is the inherent telos, or ultimate aim, of human speech (Habermas 
1981:287). Reaching understanding is considered by Habermas to be a process of 
reaching agreement, and a genuine and subjective agreement, in turn, rest on 
convictions common to both parts in a communication, meaning that the agreement 
has to be accepted or presupposed as valid by the participants (Habermas 1981:286-
287). 
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Whether this mode of using language is, as Habermas said, the inherent telos of 
human speech will be analyzed and criticized later in relation to the views of the later 
Wittgenstein. 
 
Social actions are distinguished by Habermas, following Max Weber (1864-1920), in 
actions oriented towards egocentric success and in actions oriented towards reaching 
understanding. Communicative actions are here distinguished as social actions 
oriented towards reaching understanding, and thus do not involve actions done by 
agents aiming towards an egocentric success (Habermas 1981:285-287). 
 
The point in focusing on communicative actions is that these can be said to be inter-
subjective actions where two parts come in a relation, or exchange, to reach or not 
reach an agreement about the validity of a meaning. 
 
In order to get a clearer picture of what a theory of communicative action aims 
towards we will present the analytic action theory, which could in this context be 
seen as the antithesis. Analytic action theory looks at action as something done by an 
isolated agent, and does not consider the mechanism for coordinating actions. 
According to this theory it is through these mechanisms that interpersonal relations 
come about (Habermas 1981:273-274). 
 
Here action is seen as an intervention of an actor into an objective world (one world 
of existing states of affairs) and thus does not account for an interrelation between an 
actor and the world. In this way, analytic action theory does not bring any answers to 
the questions posed from a sociological view or theory of action (Habermas 
1981:274). 
 
In this way, analytical action theory does not account for intersubjectivity nor for 
social-interrelatedness (i.e. the subject, its identity and practices, the social context 
and states of affairs) as being an intrinsic part of a whole and thus they/these being 
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engendered by an ongoing interrelation and interaction between the three (subject, 
social context and states of affairs). This is indeed what Habermas is trying to 
demonstrate through a theory of communicative action. 
 
According to Habermas it makes sense, from a sociological point of view, to start by 
looking at communicative action, because communication is needed within the social 
context in order to effectively coordinate actions, in other words, understanding in 
language is the medium for coordinating actions (Habermas 1981:274). Because 
communication entails understanding, the theory of communicative action is 
grounded in a study of the nature of meaning, i.e. a study and development of 
theories of meaning. In Habermas’ words:  
 
To explain what I mean by “an attitude oriented towards reaching 
understanding,” I have to analyze the concept of “reaching 
understanding.” (Habermas 1981:286) 
 
The theory of communicative action will attempt to keep in view the following 
problem: 
 
How the actions of several actors are linked to one another by means of 
the mechanisms of reaching understanding, that is, how they can be 
interlaced in social spaces and historical times. (Habermas 1981:275) 
 
In this line, one of the main goals of the theory of communicative action is to show 
“how communicative acts–that is, speech acts or equivalent nonverbal expressions–
take on the function to coordinating action and make their contribution to building up 
interactions.” (Habermas 1981:278) 
 
By focusing on the functions of language as presented by Karl Bühler (1879- 1963) 
and by basing it on other pragmatical approaches to investigating meaning, such as 
the analyses of rules for using linguistic expressions, Habermas’ intentions are to 
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distance himself from an objectivistic conception for reaching understanding between 
senders and receivers and to come closer to a pragmatic concept of interaction among 
speaking and acting subjects, these interactions are, according to Habermas, mediated 
through acts of reaching understanding (Habermas 1981:276). 
 
Therefore Habermas will base the development of the theory of communicative 
action on three distinctive approaches for investigating how participants of 
communicative acts reach understanding. The theories used by Habermas are 
intentionalism, formal semantics and use theory of language, which in turn correlate 
with the schema of language functions proposed in Karl Bühler’s Sprachtheorie 
(1934). This classification of language functions places the linguistic expression in 
relation to the speaker, to the world and to the hearer (Habermas 1998:277). 
These functions are: 
 
1. A cognitive function: for example that of representing a state of affairs. In this 
case the linguistic expression is related to the world, or states of affairs. 
2. An expressive function: for example that of making known personal, private 
or mental experiences. Here the linguistic expression is related to the speaker. 
3. An appellative function: for example that of making or directing a request. 
The linguistic expression is, in this case, related to the hearer. 
This appellative function is then divided by Habermas into: 
a. A regulative use of language: where participants raise normative 
validity claims, and relate their utterances to something in the common 
social world. 
b. An imperative use of language: where participants relate their 
utterances to something in the objective world, and the illocutionary 
force is to get a hearer to act in a particular way so that the intended state 
of affairs comes into existence (Habermas 1981:275 and 278). 
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Following this, the linguistic sign functions simultaneously as a symbol, by being 
correlated to states of affairs; as an index or indicator, by pointing to and depending 
on the speaker’s subjectivity, which it expresses; and as a signal, that appeals to and 
affects the hearer’s external and internal behavior (Habermas 1981:275). 
Theories of meaning 
- Or what it is to understand the meaning of a symbolic expression: 
Intentionalism 
Many of the contemporary discussions around intentionalism were anticipated by 
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) in his book, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint 
(1874). Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who was both the founder of phenomenology 
and a student of Brentano, has lead the phenomenological analysis, which has “[…] 
tried to show that the essential property of intentionality of being directed onto 
something is not contingent upon whether some real physical target exists 
independently of the intentional act itself.”20 
Intentionalism perceives language as a tool used by subjects to express beliefs or 
intentions. The subject is segregated from the world, but at the same time has 
sovereignty and power, because of his or her status as acting subjects. Following this 
context the idea that language, because of its quality as a connecting instrument 
between individual subjectivities, should contribute to forming meaning and 
intersubjective relations, comes second to the notion that what is expressed in 
language is not determined by the words chosen, but rather by what the subject 
wishes to express. This means that the meaning of an utterance is determined only by 
the intentions the speaker has, when he or she expresses it, an example on this could 
be expressed as follows: 
What is meant by S is, in many cases, not determined by what is said, i.e. The 
meaning of an utterance “x”, which is uttered by S with the intention of creating an 
                                         
20
 Pierre Jacob, 2003. Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ 
 74 
effect r in H, within a particular context, means that even though the utterance is “x” 
the effect is not “x” but r. 
Formal Semantics 
Formal semantics, as presented by Frege and the early Wittgenstein, can be seen as 
an opposition to intentionalism, since what was by intentionalism considered to be 
the primary source to meaning in language – the subjective and psychological aspects 
– are here believed to be merely irrelevant. Furthermore what formal semantics do 
consider to be important, is what intentionalism down prioritizes, namely the logical 
and grammatical form of language. Formal semantics do not recognize that aspects as 
subjectivity and intentions have any connection to meaning. The theory makes a clear 
segregation between the pragmatic and the semantic aspects of language and 
conclude, that what determines the meaning of a sentence is the conditions under 
which it is true. 
Use theory of meaning 
The use theory of meaning is what is presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical 
investigations and later developed further by Austin and Searle. In short the theory 
claims that the meaning of a word is determined by its use, though not subjectively 
determined by the intentions of the subject as in intentionalism, rather it comes about 
in relation to the language game in which it is used. 
 
For a theory of communicative action it is important to start looking at meaning as 
coming from the structure of the linguistic expression rather than solely from the 
speakers intention, as it happens for example in the case of intentionalism. 
 
So a hearer H needs, above all, to be able to understand the meaning of the symbolic 
expression communicated by a speaker S, and not only S’s intention to communicate, 
in order for H to grasp what S meant (Habermas 1981:275). According to Habermas, 
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that which transmits meaning (the bearer of meaning) is not isolated signs but instead 
elements of a language system. In this language system the semantic content, or 
meaning, is determined by the relation between a sentence and a state of affairs, and 
the form or structure of the sentence is determined by the syntactic rules. 
 
These two aspects are somehow bonded by rules (semantic and syntactic rules) and 
therefore possible to structure in a system of rules, which can then in turn be 
approached by an analysis of the representational function of language. This 
approach will cover the cognitive function of language. The appellative and 
expressive function of language belongs to a more pragmatic dimension, or aspect, 
that will be left to an empirical analysis (Habermas 1981:276). Thus, the pragmatic 
aspect of language is not determined by a general system of rules, at least not in the 
same way as the constitutive rules of syntax are.  
 
A question that could be addressed at Habermas is why the cognitive function of 
language is not considered also to be a pragmatic aspect of language as such. One 
could claim that this cognitive function does at least have a pragmatic use and value.  
 
The ontological turn brought by the semantics founded by Frege and developed by 
the early Wittgenstein disengages itself from the view that the representational 
function of language works by names designating objects.  
 
“The meaning of language, and the understanding of sentence meanings, 
cannot be separated from language’s inherent relation to the validity of 
statements. Speakers and hearers understand the meaning of a sentence 
when they know under what conditions it is true. Correspondingly, they 
understand the meaning of a word when they know what contribution it 
makes to the capacity for truth of a sentence formed with its help. Thus 
semantics developed the thesis that the meaning of a sentence is 
determined by its truth conditions.” (Habermas 1981:275-276) 
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This way of looking at and analyzing sentences is clearly limited to the case of 
assertoric sentences, or sentences and signs with a cognitive function. But when the 
function of the sentence is expressive or appellative the above ontological approach 
becomes limited. This is solved by use theory of meaning, the approach brought by 
the later Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle who expand formal semantics from a mere 
representational function of language to an analysis of the multiplicity of 
illocutionary forces and functions (Habermas 1981:277). Here, apart from language 
being presented as a multifunctional tool capable of performing a great variety of 
actions, Habermas uses the distinction made by Austin between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts, to support his presentation of actions oriented towards reaching 
understanding and actions oriented towards reaching success (Habermas 1981:279). 
Austin classified a speech act into three different aspects: the locutionary act, which 
is the act of uttering the sentence or message; the illocutionary act, which is the 
intended aim of the speaker during an utterance; and the perlocutionary act, which is 
the resultant act or state of affairs produce by the utterance. 
Furthermore Habermas clearly uses this differentiation between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts to justify his claim that communicative action is language’s per se 
role. This is done by showing that in communicative action the perlocutionary aim of 
the speech act is clear and open for the hearer in contrast to a success oriented act 
where the speaker needs to conceal his perlocutionary aim. (Habermas 1981:292)  
However this argument, and in particular the status given by Habermas to 
communicative action as language’s inherent telos, can be questioned in light of the 
later Wittgenstein’s view, which gives the status to lying that of being just another 
language game, which indeed “… needs to be learn like any other one” (PI § 249), 
and thus does not give to the sincere use of language which strives towards a genuine 
and subjective agreement/understanding any particular status in relation to other 
forms of language use. 
 
On the other hand one could agree that if the concealment of perlocutionary 
intentions, when these are of a strategic, success oriented and egotistic nature, were 
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the norm, then the institution of language as such would lose its value and ultimately 
its use. People could not longer trust each other, and therefore communication would 
become pointless. But one could argue that the premise of the hidden perlocutionary 
intention to support the argument is not really adequate; one could hide one’s 
perlocutionary intention in order to help someone else, for example if someone 
comes into a room and asks with a gun in his hand and an expression of anger in his 
face  “Where is Steen?!” The hearer, supposing that she knows where Steen is, could 
choose to answer by pointing to a place far away from where Steen finds himself in 
order to avoid a conflict between the man and Steen. In this case she would be hiding 
her perlocutionary aim with the intention of saving Steen’s life. Since the “quality” of 
the intention behind hiding or not hiding the perlocutionary aim is what makes a 
speech act to be success oriented or not, the proposal is then that the question of 
whether language’s inherent telos is of a communicative character or not would need 
to be further discussed in the context of a philosophy dealing with ethics. 
 
Returning to Habermas’ own presentation, communicative action is an interaction 
where “…all participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another 
and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation…”(Habermas 1981:294) 
and this is done in order to arrive at an agreement which serves as the base for a 
common understanding and consensual coordination about the individuals’ actions 
(Habermas 1981:295). The following table from Theorie des Kommunikativen 
Handelns, shows the way the different types of actions function in relation to the 
different features posed in Habermas’ theory: 
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In the diagram, apart from the three types of actions that constitute communicative 
action (Conversation, normatively regulated action and dramaturgical actions), the 
different characteristics of a strategic action are presented. 
 
Habermas’ intention is to establish validity claims and world-relations for other 
modes of language than assertoric ones. He proposes to conceive the illocutionary 
role of language as “…the component that specifies which validity claim a speaker is 
raising with his utterance, how he is raising it, and for what.” (Habermas 1981:278) 
Habermas proposes that every speech act can be rejected as invalid under three 
criteria, or claims to validity. These are: a) the normative rightness of the utterance, 
in the case of normatively regulated action b) the correctness or truth of the 
existential presupposition, or in other words, whether it is true or not, in the case of a 
conversation and c) the subjective truthfulness, in the case of a dramaturgical action. 
So for a speech act to have a communicative intent the speaker should: a) perform a 
 79 
speech act that is right in relation to the normative context, so between the two parts 
an intersubjective relation recognized as legitimate will come about; b) make a true 
statement, so that the hearer will accept and share the knowledge of the speaker; or c) 
express truthfully his beliefs, intentions, feelings, experiences, desires, etc. so that the 
hearer will come to believe what is said (Habermas 1981:307). 
 
These three types of claims to validity show how speech acts serve as the medium for 
achieving understanding in relation to: a) establishing legitimate social conventions, 
norms or orders; b) existing or non-existing states of affairs; or c) private experiences 
and states of mind, as well as being related to Bühler’s three functions of language in 
the following way: rightness relates explicitly to the appellative function, correctness 
to the cognitive function and truthfulness to the expressive function. 
 
When participants in communicative action reach understanding, they do so within 
three world-relations, our social world of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations, 
the objective world of existing states of affairs, and the speaker’s own subjective 
world of experiences. Thus participants claim validity within those three aspects. 
(Habermas 1981:308) 
Lifeworld and Groundedness 
By taking into consideration the aspect of illocutionary force, or, in other words, the 
intention behind the speech act, Habermas shows how a speaker can motivate a 
hearer to act in a certain manner, to accept an offer contained in the message, or to 
take a new belief, or status, and through this “…accede to a rationally motivated 
binding (or bonding: bindung) force.” (Habermas 1981:278). The aspect of the 
rationality of action found in communicative action allows one to grasp the processes 
of societal rationalization in their wholeness. This implies that Habermas’ method not 
only grasps at the explicit knowledge created in modern Europe through the 
development of sciences, on which Max Weber focused and that came to rationalize 
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many of the traditional practices present in society, but also takes into consideration 
the implicit knowledge that serves, and exists as a background for cooperative 
processes of interpretation (Habermas 1981:335). 
 
This implicitness is what is named by Habermas as lifeworld; the social-, cultural-
knowledge background that remains concealed for the participants of a 
communication and which presents itself only in the “…prereflective form of taken-
for-granted background assumptions and naively mastered skills.” This background 
and context is a great determinant for the way communicative acts are interpreted 
(Habermas 1981:335). Meaning cannot be thought of independently from the 
contextual conditions in which a speech act takes place, or by which the meaning of 
the speech act is subjected. Habermas writes that “… for each type of speech act 
there are general contextual conditions that must be met if the speaker is to be able to 
achieve illocutionary success”. On the other hand, the general contextual conditions 
are also determined, or derived, to a certain extent, by the literal meaning given by 
the grammatical and syntactical rules, of the linguistic expression (Habermas 
1981:335). 
 
From this Habermas raises a critique in relation to Wittgenstein’s earlier and later 
philosophical presentations. In relation to language games, as presented by the later 
Wittgenstein, these are constituted by rules, which become conventions within 
certain forms of life. According to Habermas these conventions and rules are in turn 
determined, in part, by the grammatical and syntantic meaning of the speech acts that 
constitute those rules: Meaning comes from context, but all contexts must at some 
point measure themselves against (or stand in some relation to) the world. Every 
speech act, when seen as an attempt to reach understanding of something, is an 
attempt to reach understanding about something in the world, and thus, the privileged 
position of cognitive language, that Wittgenstein left behind after Tractatus is 
reintroduced by Habermas. 
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His argument can be expressed in the following way: “Without the propositional 
content “That p”, which is expressed in cognitive language use in the form of an 
assertoric proposition p, even communicative use [(i.e. expressive, regulative and 
imperative uses)] would be impossible, indeed it would have no content.” (Habermas 
1984: 62) 
 
Following this line, Habermas’ critique to Wittgenstein becomes understandable, 
when the former says that in Wittgenstein’s later Philosophy, the status of the 
cognitive function of language is reduced, or equalized, to the level of just another 
language game with the same status as, for example a joke. 
 
In this context it should be noted that Habermas’ main aim in relation to Wittgenstein 
is not to criticize his work, but on the contrary to use it as a supporting thesis for his 
theory. It can, however, be noticed, that in Habermas’ lectures in the beginning of the 
1970’s he had a more critical, yet respectful, approach towards Wittgenstein’s work. 
 
The implicitness suggested by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations and 
agreed upon, to a certain degree, by Habermas as a shared implied knowledge that 
enables us to communicate, brings Habermas to the discussion of how this implied 
knowledge plays a role in the socialization of the subject. This knowledge “…does 
not stand at our disposition,” in the sense that society and individuals cannot 
objectivize it and therefore cannot analyze it (Habermas 1981:336). It is expressed as 
a taken-for-grantedness in the daily lives of individuals. This clearly becomes a topic 
for discussion within philosophy, which Wittgenstein takes up in his work On 
Certainty Wittgenstein refers to this taken-for-granted, implicit knowledge in the 
following aphorism in On Certainty:  
 
And now if I were to say “It is my unshakeable conviction that etc.”, this 
means in the present case too that I have not consciously arrived at the 
conviction by following a particular line of thought, but that it is anchored 
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in all my questions and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch it. 
(Wittgenstein 1969. ¶ 103) 
 
If this grounddedness is so, then the criteria for the knowledge that we base our lives 
upon is only that, that exact knowledge is the one implemented in us by our forms of 
life. This implies that:  
 
If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not what is true, nor yet 
false. (Wittgenstein 1969. ¶ 205) 
 
If the truths in which we are grounded are merely the truths emphasized by our form 
of life, then our grounding is not necessarily more true than any other knowledge that 
we could have been grounded in. 
Conclusion 
Habermas’ theory on communicative action makes explicit the embedment of 
language in the social and intersubjective context by showing how mutual 
understanding and agreement comes about through communicative practices, which 
are in turn based on language. The way communicative action serves as a unique 
practice to organize and coordinate the social realm is also made explicit. This is 
seen, for example, in the simple communicative action that takes place through the 
use of traffic lights, done in order to organize and coordinate a safe and fluent traffic, 
up to all kinds of more complex communicative acts such as the laws of a state and 
international agreements of all sorts. 
 
In this sense the relation between thought, language and the world is clearly seen in 
relation to the intersubjective understanding about the world that language is based 
on. Nevertheless, the status Habermas gives to communicative action, as being the 
inherent telos of language is questionable. More precise, as discussed in page 77, it is 
arguable whether formal pragmatics serves as the adequate method to arrive at this 
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conclusion. It is clear that in the line of the later Wittgenstein, one could say that 
communicative action, as proposed by Habermas, can be seen as just another 
language game, that arises within particular forms of life and is based on certain rules 
and conventions. What is interesting to bring to light in this context is that those rules 
and conventions are in turn created and agreed upon through the practice of 
communicative action itself, and in relation to this it is tempting to attribute to this 
practice a distinctive status within language use and -games. 
 
Due to Habermas’ analysis, this project is once more being steered towards the 
discussion of the role of philosophy, by making us look into the implicit knowledge 
that grounds common understanding and intersubjectivity. This implicitness clearly 
goes beyond the graspable and analyzable, and thus the question of whether 
philosophy should deal with it or not arises. At least one can conclude by asserting 
that philosophical inquiries, reflections and investigations have the potential and 
ability to recognize the ground for social and individual assumptions about what is 
considered truthful or not. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
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Thought, Language and the World 
Tractatus 
In Tractatus thought, language and the world are related to each other due to their 
shared logical structure. Wittgenstein presents this in his picture theory in the 
following way; a state of affairs is comprised of a variety of objects that stand in a 
particular way. This particular way, or relation, the objects stand in is what the word 
structure refers to. The same structure is found in a representation, or picture, of a 
state of affairs, this shared structure is what relates it to the state of affairs. This 
representation can be a thought or a proposition that depicts a physical state of 
affairs. It could also be a proposition that represents a thought and, why not add, a 
state of affairs that represents a thought, for example the state of affairs that happen 
in a stage during a play represent the thoughts of the play’s director, which in turn are 
an (interpretative) representation of the play’s script. 
 
This common representational component is called logical form. In Tractatus it is 
due to this logical pervasiveness that representations are possible; if the world, 
reality, would not be logical, it could not be thought of, it could not be represented. 
This, as mention previously in the chapter on Tractatus, could be questioned since it 
could be argued that it is possible to think about transcendental phenomena such as 
God and it is possible to refer to it. But yet it is clear that it would not be possible to 
represent God, in language or form, in a way that could connote its full qualities and 
forms, regardless of they being a fact or not. So it is possible to “talk” about non-
logical phenomena, including logic itself, but it is certainly not possible to represent 
it clearly.  
 
Another “bonding” aspect between the picture and the pictured is the sense of the 
picture that makes it to “reach right out” to the state of affairs. So in the context of 
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Tractatus the way thought, language and the world relate to each other is through a 
shared logical form. Logic itself, by being transcendental, cannot be clearly 
represented, it makes itself manifest in these three aspects. 
Philosophical Investigations 
The notion of the relation between thought, language and the world in Philosophical 
Investigations differs significantly from that of Wittgenstein’s earlier philosophy. 
This comes from the notions being inscribed in their own realm, so to speak: 
utterances concerning thoughts, language and the world are only possible by 
thinking, speaking while existing in the world. 
 
These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one 
behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to 
be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is 
missing). (§96) 
 
This shows that language games are essential for how thought, language and the 
world obtain their meanings. However, in the following it will firstly be considered 
how Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations remarks on these terms and their 
relation, while not dealing with language games. Thereafter there is a discussion of 
their inclusion in language games and the consequences it has for realizing their 
conception. 
Wittgenstein claims that a thought cannot be detached from language:  
 
Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and sense to 
speaking, and which it would be possible to detach from speaking […] 
(§339) 
 
Speech with and without thought is to be compared with the playing of a 
piece of music with and without thought. (§341) 
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Their exists thought before language, still it is necessary to know language and its use 
to have, in turn, thoughts which construct and make sentences come in to mind.  
 
The relation between language and form of life is their connected presence in the 
communicative forum where language is used, adopted and evolved; hence also the 
perception of the world belonging to the human form of life. Wittgenstein says that: 
“[…] to speak a language is take part in a activity or form of life […]” (PI §23). 
Hence, the fact that humans can speak, make them able to think and this is the 
condition for the human form of life to be encapsulating the human perception of the 
world.  
 
So far language, thought and the world as they are addressed in Philosophical 
Investigations is broad. Their inclusion in language games is dealt with in the 
following.  
 
Words get emphasized and addressed more or less differently in various language 
games. Thus the notions of language, thought and the world do not have any 
preconceived conceptualizations prior to their inclusion in language games, because 
they are merely words themselves. This means – while keeping in mind that meaning 
is use – that these notions cannot have their essence stated firmly, because such a 
postulated essence would only be reasonable to infer in one context, in one language 
game (or several joined ones). Philosophical Investigations itself is one such context.  
 
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential, in our 
investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of 
language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, 
word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order is super-order 
between–so to speak– super-concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words 
“language”, “experience”, “world”, have a use, it must be as humble a one 
as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”. (PI §97) 
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So language, thought and the world as terms are not justified to serve as canopy-
terms in relation to other terms merely through their use in sentences. Still this does 
not purport to say that they are not considered of greater stature, it only reveals – as 
earlier noticed (PI: 291) – how alike language is when considered as a whole and 
how dissimilarities of language games go unnoticed from such a viewpoint. 
 
Hence the term ‘language’ cannot be considered from a viewpoint that considers 
language in its whole. It must be considered from the essence it gets by use of it in a 
language game; from the surrounding context in that language game. This creates a 
‘loop’ because within language games, language must, according to Philosophical 
Investigations, be treated as consisting of language games. Examination of language 
as a unity would only be possible if one was able to know all possible uses of it in all 
language games, at the same time, only then would it be possible to speak of a 
‘language’. This can, of course, not be achieved, because new language games arise 
with new notions of concepts/terms (PI §23) 
 
Grounds for Meaning 
In Tractatus meaning comes about as a result of the logical structures of language 
and the way this is related to states of affairs in the world. The consequence of this is 
that “Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly” (TLP 4.116) and 
“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” (TLP 7); either 
propositions can have a logical representation in states of affairs and are therefore 
completely clear and meaningful or they can belong to the transcendental; be without 
representation and be nonsensical. This leads back to the role of philosophy; 
philosophy should concern itself with continuously drawing a line between the two. 
Philosophical Investigations presents a radically different viewpoint; meaning is not 
fixed, embedded in the logical structure of language, but rather something changeable 
that comes out of the context – or language game – in which a word is used. 
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Furthermore, meaning seems, in Tractatus, to arise from something outside language: 
All logical propositions eventually gain their meaning from elementary propositions, 
which again gain their meaning from primitive signs that get their meaning from 
simple objects in the world. As primitive signs do not get their meaning from other 
words, but from objects in the world, language seems to get its meaning slipped in by 
the backdoor – from objects in the world. Also this is thoroughly different in 
Philosophical Investigations, where meaning is not produced outside language, but in 
language – meaning is use. 
The Social Realm 
The brief, but yet enriching study of Habermas’ theory of communicative action has 
shown how the relation between thought, language and the world is clearly seen in 
relation to the intersubjective understanding about the world and about individuals’ 
private experiences, which language use brings about. Communicative practices 
serve as coordinators, organizers and constructors of the social and physical realm, 
which in turn affects individuals’ mental realm. In short – language pervades it all. 
 
Another aspect, which is present here, is that language, within a social context, can 
be used to bring about certain desirable states of affairs through the use of speech 
acts, regardless of whether the intention behind the act is oriented towards reaching a 
selfish success, or whether it is oriented towards reaching understanding and a 
common goal. From Wittgenstein’s perspective Habermas’ claim about language’s 
intrinsic function being that of a communicative nature can certainly be questioned, 
since communicative use of language has the same status as any other language 
game. However, Habermas has a point, since rules and conventions, which serve as 
necessary conditions for semantical and pragmatical understanding come about 
through a communicative use of language. On another level, one could argue that if 
one does not consider the communicative use of language as common denominator 
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and ground in a dialogue, the institution of language as such would be pointless, i.e. 
people would have no grounds to trust each other in any given circumstance.  
 
The Role of Philosophy 
The way in which the role of philosophy is perceived in Philosophical Investigations 
and Tractatus is in many aspects compatible. In both cases Wittgenstein argues that 
philosophical problems arise as a result of our misuse of language, though this 
happens in different ways in the two works; in Tractatus it is a result of the fact that 
philosophers attempt to solve problems that do not belong to the logical realm but to 
the transcendental and thus cannot be talked about – or solved – in a meaningful way.  
 
In Philosophical Investigations, philosophical problems emerge from philosophers 
taking concepts out of their context to debate their meaning; but since a word gains 
meaning exactly from this context – the language game in which it is used – this is 
not possible, and again it leads philosophy into meaninglessness. Wittgenstein 
suggests that philosophers, in order to overcome this problem, should concern 
themselves with describing the way words are used in various language games, and 
thereby describe their meaning. As the use of a word, and thereby its meaning, can 
differ and change from one language game to another, Wittgenstein claims that this 
descriptive method could be practiced in many varying ways. However, this is 
remarkably different from Tractatus, where he holds that there is only one valid 
method for philosophy, namely to draw the line between what can be said in a 
meaningful way and what cannot: 
 
6.53  The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: 
to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of 
natural science –i.e. something that has nothing to do with 
philosophy– and then, whenever someone else wanted to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had 
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failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. 
Although it would not be satisfying to the other person –he 
would not have the feeling that we were teaching him 
philosophy– this method would be the only strictly correct one. 
 
However, there exists an agreement between the early and the later Wittgenstein in 
the conviction that philosophy should not be a scientific method providing answers in 
the same way as natural sciences do. In that sense, the role of philosophy is to 
attempt to clarify, but never to reach definite results; philosophy is never finished, but 
an ongoing process, or as Wittgenstein calls it; a therapeutic activity.  
Last Reflections 
In a sense Wittgenstein seems to be quite sound in his notion of the role of 
philosophy as being that of describing the use of words in various contexts. 
Nevertheless, one could ask whether philosophy, or rather the person practicing it, 
could not be held accountable for specifying particular aspects of an utterance, as 
being contradicting, while discarding others? In other words, when one describes, the 
described spontaneously becomes more significant, than that which is not described. 
What criteria should decide which words and rules to focus on? Here the aspect of 
power gets to play a role in the philosophical method.  
 
Yet philosophy as such cannot escape language use. In this sense one could say that 
philosophy will never be able to see the whole picture, due to its lack of ability to 
escape the conventions and practices found in that, which philosophy itself 
investigates. Following this argument we can conclude that the role of philosophy 
should be to clarify concepts in language and thereby the world and phenomena. A 
consequence of this would be that philosophy would play a role in attempting to 
clarify our deep-rooted convictions and certainties; the taken-for-grantedness that 
permeates our every day lives, to challenge them and to question whether they are 
valid or not, giving us the opportunity to change our worldview. 
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Many aspects of the mystical also fall within our conventions and certainties – ethical 
rules for example. In this sense, one could see philosophy taking a role in relation to 
transcendental aspects, at least aspects such as logic, ethics, aesthetics and the like, 
and inscribing them into an academic realm through the establishment of theories that 
are then used by other disciplines – such as, social sciences, psychology, pedagogy 
and the like – in order to support their studies, and as tools to measure their objects of 
study. 
 
But it seems that Wittgenstein does have a point, when arguing that philosophy 
should concern itself with the descriptions of the use of words in their context; 
acknowledging that we can never escape language, everything that we will (ever) be 
able to grasp and describe will be embedded in language. Thus, describing the use of 
words will bring us to discussions of everything that lies inside of that which can be 
grasped. But this point is also the exact point that can be questioned. Could it not be 
said that – even though Wittgenstein is right in saying that  “the limits of my 
language means the limits of my world” (TLP 5.6), and thereby concluding that any 
attempt to contradict language is in vain – the role of philosophy is to attempt to 
penetrate or expand that limit? Of course, this is a paradox, as it is impossible. But 
can the attempt in itself, even though failing, not lead somewhere? Can it not “wax 
and wane” our world somehow, in the same manner as the transcendental is said to 
do in Tractatus?
21
 
A better understanding about the use of language, about our convictions, certainties 
and taken-for-grantedness leads to an awareness of the otherwise implicit knowledge 
we have about our forms of life, culture and the world. This awareness leads in turn 
to the ability of transcending, or going beyond, – to a certain extent and in a gradual 
process – the conventions we are embedded in. This happens as a result of 
understanding conventions as being just that; mere conventions. There is of course no 
way in philosophy to do this by stepping outside these very conventions, and 
                                         
21
 TLP 6.43 
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therefore no way to transcend them definitely from one day to the other, but still, the 
very understanding produced by the philosophical inquiry induces a gradual change 
of implicit believes and conventions, which in turn produces a different world view. 
This changed view leads to new words – new language to describe new conventions 
– and if  “the limits of my language means the limits of my world” then these new 
words will gradually lead us to a new world, by expanding the limits of our language. 
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Chapter VI 
Formalities 
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Group process  
When beginning this project our aim was to illuminate the psychological and 
sociological aspects of language, this field of interest had arissen because the group 
members had experienced to be in different languages and thereby felt how much it 
means for ones identity. When dealing with a project about Wittgenstein our starting 
point was therefore to focus on Philosophical Investigations and relate this to our  
own realm by concrete cases, or by psychological writings. After reading the first 
twenty paragraphs of Philosophical Investigations we experienced that in order to 
fully understand this work we would have to see it in the light of Tractatus. This 
work could provide us with a different view on philosophy of language. Thereby we 
would be able to compare and contradict them in order to reflect upon it ourselves 
and from there create more satisfactory interpretations.  We discovered that the works 
of Wittgenstein, especially Tractatus, was not a ground for empirical research. At this 
point we decided to investigate the relation between thought, language and the world 
from a philosophical viewpoint, but still maintain the sociological aspect of language, 
by applying Habermas’’ theories.  
From this point, our view on language naturally became more philosophical. From 
thinking psychological and sociological on language our view changed into thinking 
philosophically on language, with aspects of sociology as a further perspective. 
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Resumes  
Dansk Resumé  
Denne opgave har til formål at belyse relationen mellem sproget, verden og tanker. 
Til dette formål bruges den tidligere Wittgensteins værk Tractatus og den senere 
Wittgensteins værk Filosofiske Undersøgelser. Tractatus er et værk hvori der 
forsøges at drage en grænse mellem det der kan siges logisk og det der ikke kan 
forklares på en logisk made. efterfulgt af en sprogfilosofisk teori. Filosofiske 
Undersøgelser er et værk hvori den tidligere teori delvis afvises. Sproget ses her I 
gennem dets brug og mening opstår I forhold til de særlige sammenhæng hvor 
sproget er brugt, altså sprogspillene og livsformerne. For at uddybe og perspektivere 
det sociologiske og kommunikative aspect af sproget, inddrages samfundsteoretiker 
Jurgen Habermas’ teorier. Projektet fokuserer på meningsoprindelse og på hvordan 
denne opstår I sproget, samt med filosofiens rolle som erkendelsesdisciplin  Opgaven 
sammensættes af disse forskellige syn på sprogfilosofien, hvorved der også indgår 
sammenligninger og perspektiveringer. 
Føroyskur samandráttur 
Hendan uppgávan hevur sum endamál at l!sa hvussu mál, heimurin og tankar eru 
relatera"i. Til at røkka hetta samankn!tta endamáli ver"ur n!tt fyrsta verki hjá 
Wittgenstein Tractatus og hitt seinna Heimspekingarligar Kanningar. Tractatus er 
ein roynd at seta eitt mark fyri tí sum kann fást grei"u á ein logiskan hátt og fyri tí i" 
ikki kan. Heimspekingarligar Kanningar er eitt verk hvar hendan fyrsta ástødin 
ver"ur burturvíst. Mál skilst her sum n!tsla har meiningin birtist í mun í hvørjum 
høpi mál ver"ur n!tt, sum vil siga málspøl og lívsformur. Fyri at fjarvídda tey 
sosiologisku og samskiftingarligu aspektini til mál, ver"ur inndrigi" ástø"i hja 
samfelagsástø"inginum Jurgen Habermas. Verkætlanin savnar seg um 
meiningsuppruna og hvussu hetta birtist í máli", saman og samstundis eisini vi" 
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leiklutinum heimspekin hevur sum vi"urkenningar-námsgrein. Uppgávan ver"ur 
samantvunnin vi" hesum ymsu sjónarmi"junum til málheimspekina, hvar í eisini 
innganga samanlíkningar og fjarvíddanir.  
Resumen en Español 
Este proyecto trata sobre la relación entre el pensamiento, el lenguaje y el mundo que 
nos rodea. Este estudio toma como punto de partida los trabajos del filósofo Ludwig 
Wittgenstein sobre la filosofía de la lengua. En este caso se concentrará en su primera 
obra Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) y en su libro Investigaciones Filosóficas 
(1951). Su primer libro consiste en una presentación que delimita aquello que se 
puede decir y tratar a través de la lógica. En Investigaciones Filosóficas Wittgenstein 
refuta, en un cierto grado, las teorías presentadas en su trabajo anterior. Aquí la forma 
de estudiar el lenguaje se concentra en el uso del mismo y los orígenes del 
significado se dan en relación a los contextos en los cuales el lenguaje se pone en uso 
Estos contextos son definidos por Wittgenstein como los juegos del lenguaje y las 
formas de vida. Se ha hecho también una reflexión, para profundizar el aspecto social 
y comunicativo del lenguaje, tomando como punto de partida algunas características 
de las teorías de Jürgen Habermas. El proyecto se centra en un estudio sobre los 
orígenes del significado y el rol que juega la filosofía como disciplina académica. 
Esto se desarrolla a través del estudio, comparaciones, y discusiones críticas de las 
obras y teorías mencionadas. 
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Abstract 
The purpose with this project illuminates the relation between thought, language and 
the world in relation to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. The focus is 
upon Wittgenstein’s works Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and Philosophical 
Investigations (1951). One of the main goals of Tractatus is to delineate the limits of 
what can be said and dealt logically and what cannot. Philosophical Investigations is 
a work wherein the earlier theory is rejected and contradicted. Language and meaning 
are here clarified as dynamic elements that are use and arise in relation to language 
games and forms of life. In order to emphasise the social and communicational role 
of language some aspects of Jürgen Habermas’s theories are use.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“	 Please be kind enough to send me the Bible in a small-size but still legible edition. 
There are quite a number of things I have to tell you, but I still cannot let them out.	
May things go well with you. I often think of you.		
Kind regards	
L Wittgenstein “ 
A letter to Paul Engelmann, 4. 9. 1917
